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"Another requisite of a fair trial is a fair jury."
-The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, State v. Lohm'
I. INTRODUCTION-THE NET
My research for this article was initially designed to simply collect
the entire body of jury selection law in West Virginia. No one else
had catalogued it before. I believed producing such a catalogue would
be a valuable enterprise because our courts and practitioners would
then have before them a compendium of our jury selection law. This
compendium, I hoped, would in turn lead to more rational jury
selection practices and, in the end, to the effectuation of the over-
arching theoretical purpose of jury selection-the empaneling of a
reasonably unprejudiced and unbiased jury.
2
When I began putting together this collection of the law and
sharing my concerns with others, however, I realized that a larger
picture was beginning to emerge. The picture was of jury selection
and voir dire as a large net, spread out in the water to collect those
members of the population whom we do not want swimming
through-the prejudiced, the biased, and anyone else unqualified to
serve as a juror in a criminal trial or civil lawsuit.
The net, I have learned, is an unsatisfactory one. The law of
jury selection and voir dire is uninformed and antiquated. As far as
the law in this area is concerned, the teachings of the social sciences-
psychology in particular-do not exist.
In this article I survey the condition of the current net. In the
second part of my discussion, which will appear in a future issue of
this journal, I will demonstrate that many prejudiced and biased
jurors swim through the net, discuss the reasons for their ability to
1. State v. Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924), overruled, State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d
208 (wV. Va. 1986).
2. For purposes of distinguishing two different types of a priori postures of jurors, I will refer
in this article to an a priori judgment against a person, idea, or cause as "prejudice" and an a priori
judgment in favor of a person, idea, or cause as "bias."
[Vol. 91
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JURY SELECTION IN WEST VIRGINIA
do so, and suggest what can be done to make the net a better tool
for creating more impartial jury panels.
Let me admit the obvious at the beginning. I do not pretend to
believe that all prejudice and bias can be removed or even neutralized
by use of the measures to be recommended here. Our profession,
like all professions, is limited in its capacity to reverse the imper-
fections with which human beings are born. I do believe, however,
that we can not only substantially reduce the prejudice and bias that
would otherwise exist on panels, but we can also greatly neutralize
the prejudice and bias that remain.
II. A SURVEY OF THE LAW OF CHALLENGES
My description of the net is organized around the now common
notion that jury selection is actually a process of "unselection. "3 The
court and lawyers, of course, are not free to select members of the
community at large for jury service. 4 They are limited to those whose
names are randomly drawn from the jury list, a list itself composed
of names selected at random from fixed-source lists by jury com-
missioners.5 From this group, all the lawyers and judges can do is
remove persons. Those remaining constitute the jury.
Thus, the only way to describe the net is to describe the me-
chanisms for removing jurors. Let us begin with the four grounds
available to attorneys for challenging jurors: challenges to the array,
challenges for cause, challenges to the favor, and peremptory chal-
lenges.
3. To the best of my knowledge, it was Irving Younger who coined the term "jury unselection."
Younger, Jury Selection (video-taped lectures) Tape 1 (1986).
4. This is not to say that there have not been those who desired to hand-pick jurors whom
they believed to be specially qualified to hear cases. The notion of such "blue ribbon" juries has been
a matter of some controversy in the past. See, e.g., Baker, In Defense of the "Blue Ribbon" Jury,
35 IOWA L. REv. 409 (1950).
In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 67 S.Ct. 1613, 91 L.Ed. 2043 (1947), the United States
Supreme Court upheld the use of state court "blue ribbon" juries.
5. West Virginia Code § 52-1-5 (1988) requires that commissioners select names from at least
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A. Challenges to the Array
A challenge to the array is predicated upon some fundamental
defect in the process which brought forth the panel and the jury list
from which it was drawn, such that the process, the panel, and the
list must all be invalidated 6. Such challenges are commonly grounded
on deviations from the statutory scheme for composing jury lists and
selecting panelists7 or on constitutional defects.8
The principal constitutional ground on which challenges to the
array have been based is the fair trial requirement of the sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.9 Despite recent reforms in
6. See State v. Cartwright, 20 W. Va. 32, 36 (1882) (a challenge to the array must be based
on an irregularity affecting the whole panel of jurors).
7. W. JORDAN, JuRy SELEcTcoN 45-46 (1980). Svuh attacks in West Virginia have been uniformly
unsuccessful. An example of such a challenge in West Virginia is State v. Nuckolls, 152 W. Va. 736,
166 S.E.2d 3 (1969). In Nuckolls, the court re-affirmed an historical distinction in the administrative
provisions of the law that governed jury list composition, calling some mandatory and some directory.
The failure to abide by mandatory provisions would normally result in the invalidation of the list.
Failure to meet the technical requirements of directory terms, however, would not result in invalidation,
assuming substantial compliance with the law and the absence of prejudice to the appellant. In Nuckolls,
the jury commissioners allowed the clerk to perform some of their duties. The court found these
statutorily-mandated duties to be directory and the compliance to be substantial.
Other challenges based on non-compliance with procedural requirements include State v. Mills,
33 W. Va. 453, 10 S.E. 808 (1890) (unsuccessful attack upon method of selecting jurors from by-
standers); State v. Huff, 80 W. Va. 468, 92 S.E. 681 (1917) (unsuccessful attack upon a jury list
prepared by a jury commissioner whose term had expired); State v. Price, 96 W. Va. 498, 123 S.E.
283 (1924) (unsuccessful attack upon a jury that had been summoned to appear on a day other than
the first term of court without the required written court order); State v. Carduff, 142 W. Va. 18,
93 S.E.2d 502 (1956) (unsuccessful attack upon list with an insufficient number of jurors drawn out
of term); and State v. Hankish, 147 W. Va. 123, 126 S.E.2d 42 (1962) (unsuccessful attack upon jurors
whose names had been drawn improperly).
In a case decided under the 1986 reforms to jury law (see text accompanying footnotes 10-14),
Bennett v. Warner, 372 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1988), the West Virginia Supreme Court held that the
requirement that juror qualification forms be used, W. VA. CODE § 52-1-1 (1986), was mandatory in
nature, that failure to comply with the requirement was sufficient to cause reversal, and that a dem-
onstration of prejudice to the appellant was unnecessary for the appellant to prevail on appeal. (In
the course of its decision the court volunteered the opinion that the use of juror qualification forms
was discontinued by virtue of amendments to West Virginia Code chapter 52 enacted in 1988, citing
§ 52-1-5a of the statute. This is an error. The use of such forms remains a requirement. See § 52-1-
7(b).
8. For an extensive review of methods for challenging the array on constitutional grounds, see
JuywoRK (D. Kairas & B. Bonora, 2d ed. 1987).
9. Several such attacks on the constitutionality of panels have been made in West Virginia in
recent years, all without success. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 157 W. Va. 341, 201 S.E. 2d 309 (1973)
(attacking the exclusion of poor persons); State ex rel. Whitman v. Fox, 236 S.E.2d 565 (,V. Va. 1977)
(attacking the exclusion of non-voting non-landowners from a grand jury); State v. Williams, 249 S.E.2d
[Vol. 91
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the West Virginia statutory procedure for composing jury lists, the
sixth amendment remains an important ground on which to mount
a challenge to the array. To understand the contours of such an
attack, a quick review of the reforms is in order.
Until 1986, West Virginia jury lists (the lists from which panelists'
names are drawn) were composed using the "key-man" system. Un-
der this scheme, jury commissioners were essentially free to select
persons of their own liking. Jury lists were, as a result, dominated
by older, white males and excluded important groups, such as
women.10 This system was reformed in 1986 when the Legislature
required that jury commissioners randomly select names from voter
registration lists.1' This reform improved the original system by re-
placing favoritism and caprice with mandatory randomness and ob-
jective, fixed-source lists. Unfortunately, this reform was itself flawed,
for voter registration rolls are widely recognized as underrepresenting
significant portions of the population, such as racial minorities.' 2
In 1988, the West Virginia Legislature changed the sources from
which names may be drawn for jury lists, requiring that commis-
sioners use at least two of three lists: voter registration rolls, drivers
license lists, and lists of state income tax payers. 3 This system took
effect on July 1, 1988. As a result, for the next year or two we will
be dealing with jury verdicts from both systems.
4
752 (f. Va. 1978) (attacking the exclusion of non-voters); and State v. Hobbs, 282 S.E.2d 258 (fV.
Va. 1981) (attacking the exclusion of persons who do not own personal property). These cases have
been described and analyzed by the author in an earlier volume of this journal. See, DiSalvo, The
Key-Man System for Composing Jury Lists in West Virginia-The Story of Abuse, Case for Reform,
87 W. VA. L. REv. 219, 240-42 (1984).
10. For a detailed description of this system and the abuses which resulted, see DiSavo, supra
note 9, at 219. See also M. Arbogast, D. Bumgardner, & S. Knox, Prospective Jurors in West Virginia:
A Comparison (1984) (unpublished manuscript); and LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF ,VEST VIomNA,
INC., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE JURY SERVICE SELEC OTN SYSTEM I ,VasT VmGINIA (1984).
11. See W. VA. CODE chapter 52, article 1 (1986). Note that although the statutory scheme
enacted in 1986 allowed jury commissions with access to computers to use a combined master list
consisting of the voter registration list and the driver's license list, no county chose to employ both
lists.
12. See DiSalvo, supra note 9, Appendix A.
13. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-5 (1988).
14. Juries will be empanelled by courts under the 1986 system at least up to July 1, 1988, and
probably up to December 31, 1988. Appeals from the verdicts of such juries will occupy the West
Virginia Supreme Court for the ensuing year or more.
19891
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Yet, whether we are dealing with verdicts handed down by jurors
drawn from the three lists or verdicts delivered by juries created solely
from voter registration lists, these juries, to varying degrees, will be
biased.
What is the source of this bias? As I have just mentioned, voter
registration lists underrepresent cognizable groups"5 in the popula-
tion. Consequently, it is impossible to get a fair cross-section of the
community from a voter registration list. This underrepresentation
is significant because of what might be called the representative-prej-
udices theory underpinning the sixth amendment's fair cross-section
requirement.
The theory holds that no juror is without prejudice or bias and
that the only way to deal with such imperfections in humankind is
to get a fair cross-section of the population. 16 Thus, using a rough
example, in a criminal case with a black defendant, a juror who has
a racial prejudice with regard to black people will be neutralized in
the jury deliberation room by the presence of black jurors in terms
of how the prejudiced juror talks, reasons, and votes.
Because voter registration lists clearly underrepresent cognizable
groups in the population, sole reliance on these lists results in un-
derrepresentative juries, that is, juries that do not balance prejudice
and bias well. Thus, it makes good sense to allow challenges to these
arrays on the basis of the impartial-trial requirement of the sixth
amendment, which requires that the jury list represent a fair cross-
section of the community. Moreover, there is sound precedent for
such a challenge. The supreme court of a leading sister state, Cal-
ifornia, recently found such juries unconstitutional. 7
15. See Juaywomc, supra note 8, at § 5.04[l].
16. "[T]he failure to include a fair cross-section of the community on jury panels increases the
chance that intolerant viewpoints will remain unrepudiated .... " Note, Race and the Criminal Proc-
ess, 101 HARv. L. Ray. 1472, 1558 (1988).
See Professor Jon Van Dyke's limited defense of the theory in Van Dyke, Voir Dire: How Should
It Be Conducted To Ensure That Our Juries Are Representative and Impartial?, 3 HAsTmos CON. L.
QuARaiLY 65 (1976). See also, Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STANFORD
L. REv. 544, 551-52 (1975).
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Thus, as long as we continue to select potential jurors from voter
registration lists, we will have juries that underrepresent cognizable
groups and do not neutralize prejudice by balancing it. Litigants are
entitled to consider using the challenge to the array to challenge such
juries.
What of juries composed by drawing names from the new source
lists? Commissioners are now required to draw names from at least
two of three lists: 8 a modified type of drivers license list,19 the voter
registration list, and the list of state income tax payers. While drivers
license lists are the most representative and inclusive lists available, 20
each of the remaining two lists is problematic. We know that voter
registration lists are clearly underrepresentative of cognizable groups.
As for the list of state income tax payers, it is an untested list. Some
reports already have indicated that the names of women filing jointly
with their husbands cannot be picked up by the computer systems
in use at the State Tax Department.2 1 The exclusion of substantial
numbers of women would create serious constitutional difficulties. 22
Therefore, it is quite possible that many jury commissioners will
employ underrepresentative taxpayer and voter registration lists to
form underrepresentative master lists under the new jury list law.
One remedy for this imbalance of prejudices is for the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court to respond to a challenge to an array by over-
turning criminal convictions obtained using juries drawn from such
jury lists. In the past, however, the court has refused to do this in
an even more egregious situation.23 Furthermore, even if, in light of
the California precedent, the court listens more eagerly to a future
challenge to an array, overturns a conviction, and effectively requires
18. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-5(a) (1986).
19. Only the names of persons who have renewed or applied for licenses within the previous
two years will appear on the drivers license list. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-3(5) (1988). This definition is
carried over from the 1986 legislation.
20. See VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 99, 102 (1977) and DiSalvo, supra note 9, at
260-61.
21. Telephone interview with Ted Philyaw, West Virginia Supreme Court Administrator (June
1, 1988).
22. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
23. See cases collected at DiSalvo, supra note 9, at 240-42.
1989]
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a fairer cross-section on jury lists, the resulting system still will place
total reliance on the balance-of-prejudices theory.
There are good reasons to be concerned about the balance-of-
prejudices theory, however. In the civil jury context, the theory is
weakened by the size of the civil jury, now six in West Virginia.
Does the theory work as well in a jury of this size? Even if it does,
are we content to live in a world in which we fail to attempt to
achieve fair trials by employing every possible method for removing
prejudice? Finally, will balancing prejudices alone be a sufficient way
of getting at the subtle and sophisticated prejudices and biases also
described below?
In considering these questions, it is worth noting that the history
of the challenge to the array teaches us that it is useful only for
attacking large and tangible prejudices, such as those against racial
and ethnic minorities24 and women.25 The utility of the challenge to
the array for attacking subtle prejudices and biases is, by contrast,
quite limited.
Therefore, if we choose not to balance prejudice and bias-that
is to say, if the court refuses to invalidate West Virginia's sole re-
liance on voter registration lists and state tax payer lists-then the
difficult job of removing and neutralizing prejudice and bias becomes
all the more important. 26
B. Challenges for Cause
1. Challenges for Cause and Challenges to the Favor
Distinguished
A useful distinction, latent in the relevant West Virginia statute, 27
is that between challenges for cause and challenges to the favor. An
24. See, e.g., State v. Strauder, 11 W. Va. 745 (1877), rev'd sub nom. Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303 (1879); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Castaneda v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482 (1970).
25. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
26. It is evident that when the size of the jury is halved, the potential that juror prejudices and
biases will be balanced is greatly reduced.
27. West Virginia Code § 56-6-12 calls for the examination of jurors to determine whether they
[Vol. 91
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understanding of the distinction by judges and lawyers will be helpful
to them in appreciating their appropriate roles in jury selection and,
if accepted by the profession, will bring clarity to now ambiguous
areas of voir dire law.2
8
Challenges for cause are based on objective, clearly articulated,
statutory or decisional disqualification criteria. With respect to the
statutory disqualification criteria, they are so clear that the trial court
has no choice but to excuse a prospective juror whose characteristics
match one or more of the disqualification criteria. With respect to
the common law grounds, the trial court similarly must excuse a
disqualified juror.29 (Of course, the court does exercise discretion in
deciding whether a prospective juror's characteristics do in fact place
the juror in a disqualifying category.) Of these challenges, those stem-
ming from the common law are based on an a priori theoretical
assumption that jurors in particular factual categories lack the ca-
pacity to be impartial, a judgment made quite apart from the in-
dividual juror's actual ability to be impartial. Thus, the juror is said
to be tainted with "implied bias." 30
An example of a ground supporting a challenge for cause is kin-
ship. What the West Virginia Supreme Court has said about the
rationale for kinship challenges applies with equal force to the other
"implied bias" common law disqualification grounds:
[I]t is utterly impossible for any person to determine how far the judgment or
action of a person affected by [the relationship] may be swayed or controlled. It
operates upon the mind and heart of the individual secretly and silently. Its op-
eration is not disclosed by any outward manifestation other than the result.,1
are "qualified," "related to either party," have "any interest in the cause," or are "sensible to any
bias or prejudice . . . ." As the ensuing discussion in the text will point out, the challenge for cause
takes in the first three categories, while the challenge to the favor encompasses the last.
The federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§1861-77 (1982), uses language that dis-
tinguishes between the two terms: "All challenges for cause or favor . . . shall be determined by the
court." 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1982).
28. See, e.g., the discussion of the exclusion of those employed by law enforcement agencies
and the exclusion of those with relationships with such persons, infra.
29. W. JOAN, supra note 7.
30. One state, Washingtor, explicitly distinguishes in its statutory jury law between implied bias
and actual bias. WAsH. REv. CODE RCW 4.44.180. See Washington v. Parnell, 77 Wash. 2d 503, 463
P.2d 134 (1969), for an application of the distinction.
31. State v. Harris, 69 W. Va. 244, 71 S.E. 609 (1911).
1989]
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A challenge to the favor, by contrast, calls for the court to make
a prudential judgment about the individual juror's actual capacity
to be impartial. 32 In the words of our statute, the court must decide
whether a juror "is sensible of any bias or prejudice. ' 33 An example
of a prospective juror who ought to be removed for favor is one
whose opinion has been influenced by what the juror has read so
that the juror cannot give the courtroom evidence an impartial hear-
ing.
It is, of course, reversible error to deny a valid challenge for
either cause or favor.3 4
The disqualification grounds on which challenges for cause can
be predicated are found in the West Virginia Code and in West
Virginia decisional law. 35 In this section I will identify each of the
disqualifying grounds found in these two sources and describe the
treatment the ground has received from the West Virginia Supreme
Court.
2. Statutory Grounds for Cause Disqualification
The 1986 reforms, among other things, gave a clear shape to the
process and criteria by which jurors are disqualified from service.
The process begins with the presumption that the juror is qualified.36
Chapter 52, Article 1, Section 8(b) of the West Virginia Code (here-
inafter W. Va. Code) then sets out a detailed list of disqualifying
statutory criteria:
A prospective juror is disqualified to serve on a jury if the prospective juror:
(1) Is not a citizen of the United States, at least eighteen years old" and a
32. The determination of the qualifications of a juror is a problem often difficult to solve.
The fact sought to be established, whether the juror may be biased or prejudiced, rests alone
with the proposed juror, and often he may be unable to honestly determine whether he would
be unduly influenced by certain facts or situations in consideration of evidence to be offered.
Usually the answer is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge.
State v. Gargiliana, 138 W. Va. 376, 379, 76 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1953).
33. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966).
34. State v. Wilcox, 286 S.E.2d 257, 258 (W. Va. 1982).
35. The statutory disqualification criteria do not exhaust the grounds for cause removals. The
vitality of common law grounds continues. See Watkins v. Baltimore and O.R. Co., 130 W. Va. 268,
43 S.E.2d 219 (1947).
36. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8 (1988).
37. Jurors who are sixty-five years of age or older are not disqualified from service, but will
be excused upon request. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(c) (1988).
[Vol. 91
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resident of the county; 38
(2) Is unable to read, speak and understand the English language;
(3) Is incapable, by reason of substantial physical or mental disability, of
rendering satisfactory jury service; 39 but a person claiming this disqualification may
be required to submit a physician's certificate as to the disability and the certifying
physician is subject to inquiry by the court at its discretion;-
(4) Has, within the preceding two years, been summoned to serve as a petit
juror, grand juror or magistrate court juror, and has actually attended sessions
of the magistrate or circuit court and been compensated as a juror pursuant to
the provisions of section twenty-one of this article, section thirteen, article two of
this chapter, or pursuant to an applicable rule or regulation of the supreme court
of appeals promulgated pursuant to the provisions of section eight, article five,
chapter fifty of this code;
(5) Has lost the right to vote because of a criminal conviction; or
(6) Has been convicted of perjury, false swearing or other infamous offense.
4 '
38. There appears to be only one reported West Virginia case on this ground, Zickefoose v.
Kuykendall, 12 W. Va. 23 (1877). Zickefoose stands for the rule that the West Virginia Supreme Court
will not reverse the verdict of a trial court jury on which a non-resident has sat (unbeknownst to the
unsuccessful party) unless the party "has suffered injustice from the fact that such juror served upon
the case." Id. at 34. See also, State v. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 456 (1876), and State v. Greer, 22 W.
Va. 800 (1883). Later, in Watkins v. Baltimore and O.R. Co., 130 W. Va. 268, 43 S.E.2d 219 (1947),
the court articulates the harmless error rule as a three-part test:
[When] the motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial is based upon the dis-
qualification or incompetency of a juror, the burden is upon the party attacking the verdict
to show: (1) that the juror was, in fact, disqualified or incompetent to serve as a juror in
the trial of the case; (2) that the party so moving to set aside the verdict exercised due
diligence in an effort to ascertain the disqualification or incompetency of the juror prior to
empaneling of the jury or the return of its verdict; and (3) that he was prejudiced or suffered
an injustice by the fact that the disqualified or incompetent juror served on the jury.
Id. at 272, 43 S.E.2d at 222.
One would think that simply losing a verdict is prejudice enough to meet the third prong of the
Watkins test, especially in cases in which the juror could have been challenged for cause (as defined
below). After all, the very notion of cause presumes conscious or unconscious bias or prejudice in the
juror. If a juror serves on a jury and, as we must assume, contributes to the verdict at least by his
vote, if not also by his discussion in deliberations, then is not a litigant deprived of an impartial jury?
Watkins' facts illustrate the situation nicely. There the challenged juror was an employee of the de-
fendant, a clear ground for cause challenge (see below). This juror contributed to the verdict against
the plaintiff, in favo- of his employer.
The Watkins court closed its eyes to this political reality and rejected the argument that "the
mere fact that the verdict was in favor of the defendants constitutes a showing of... prejudice."
Id. at 223. This decision vitiates the wisdom of cause challenges. (See Watkins v. Baltimore & O.R.
Co., 130 W. Va. 268, 274, 43 S.E.2d 219, 224 (1947)).
39. If the mental disqualification of a juror is raised after the verdict, the court will weigh the
evidence of mental competence, but in the event of a conflict in the proof, will give great deference
to the trial court. See State v. Camp, 110 W. Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 (1931).
40. For materials dealing with jurors who become incapacitated after being sworn, see W. VA.
CODE § 62-3-7 (1984); and State v. Oldaker, 304 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1983) and the cases collected
there.
41. An infamous offense is a felony or offense punishable by death or imprisonment in the state
penitentiary. State v. Maynard, 289 S.E.2d 714, 718 (XV. Va. 1982).
1989]
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In addition to establishing these criteria, the 1986 reforms main-
tained the previously existing disqualifications for the following: ju-
rors having cases to be heard during the term of their service; 42 certain
jurors hearing criminal prosecutions for lynching;43 city residents
hearing certain cases in which their municipality is interested; 44 and
persons who have been convicted of suborning perjury. 45
Only jurors whose characteristics match one or more of these
disqualifying criteria are actually disqualified under the statute.46 The
primary aim of these criteria is to guarantee that jurors are equipped
with the minimal intellectual, social, civic, and physical abilities for
service. There is no attempt here to screen for either gross or subtle
forms of bias and prejudice (with one possible exception 47). Hence,
the contribution these criteria make to the net is minimal.
3. Common Law Grounds for Cause Disqualification
The common law grounds for cause disqualification were estab-
lished, for the most part, in the decisional law of this jurisdiction
42. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-14 (1966). In Beck v. Thompson, 31 W. Va. 459, 7 S.E. 447 (1888),
a case in which a juror who had a matter to be tried during the same term of court sat on the appellant's
trial jury, the Zickefoose harmless error rule was applied and explicitly said to govern in civil as well
as criminal cases. Beck, 31 W. Va. at 467, 7 S.E. at 449 (1888). See also, W. VA. CODE § 56-6-16
(1966). Compare Beck with Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospital, Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986)
(not improper for jurors, who earlier in the term served with plaintiff's decedent's grandmother, to
hear plaintiff's case when parties were aware during voir dire of grandmother's service and no objections
were made and extensive individual voir dire was allowed, showing no friendship with plaintiff's family).
Garrett v. Patton, 81 W. Va. 771, 95 S.E 437 (1918), provides an interesting application of the
same-term disqualification ground. In Garrett, there were no jurors on the panel who were to have
their own cases tried that term. But the plaintiff was, in fact, a person who had served with these
same jurors, hearing cases earlier that same term. The court conducted a thorough analysis of the
purpose of the same-term disqualification ground and found that the purposes for establishing the
ground applied with equal weight when applied to the question of whether jurors sitting in judgment
on another juror's case, in the same term, should be disqualified. The Garrett court found that they
should "[wlhen a litigant serves on the petit jury in the circuit court, at a term at which he has a
case to be tried by a jury, all of the other jurors with whom he has been serving are incompetent to
sit in the trial of his case," Id. at 779, 95 S.E.2d at 440, but applied the Zickefoose harmless rule
to find no error on this point.
43. W. VA. CODE § 61-6-12 (1984).
44. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-18 (1981).
45. W. VA. CODE § 61-5-3 (1984).
46. The jury selection law of West Virginia is premised on the notion that all citizens are pre-
sumptively qualified. One is removed from consideration for service only upon a showing of dis-
qualification. Note in a similar vein that the statute permits no categorical occupational or other exemptions
from service on the petit jury, as does the federal Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(5),
(6) (1982).
47. The exception concerns the disqualification for those who have served within the previous
two years. See Part Two for a description of the prejudices created by prior jury service.
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decades ago in the seminal case of State v. Dushman.48 These grounds
supplement the statutory grounds described above. 49
In Dushman, the appellant, convicted of receiving stolen goods,
complained that the trial court would not let him question jurors
whom he believed were in the employ of the corporation from which
the goods had been stolen. Although the corporation was not a party,
the West Virginia Supreme Court considered the relationship close
enough to raise reasonable suspicions about the ability of the jurors
to be impartial. Accordingly, the court reversed the conviction and
awarded a new trial. In doing so, the court articulated seven "prin-
cipal causes of challenges, prima facie disqualifying jurors .... 50
Later, the West Virginia Supreme Court would add an eighth cause.5 1
As will be apparent in Part II of this article, although these eight
criteria certainly have a great deal more to do with screening for
bias and prejudice than the statutory criteria described above, the
net remains plagued with gaping holes.
a. Kinship to Either Party Within the Ninth Degree.
When a juror is related to one of the parties within the prescribed
degree, there is no discretion to be exercised by the court. The court
must excuse the juror. 2 In criminal cases the Court has said that it
will interpret "party" to include the victim in a criminal case because
that person is a real party in interest.
53
When a relationship does not fall squarely within the prohibited
categories, the court often turns to other authority to resolve the
48. State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809 (1917).
49. Id. at 749, 91 S.E. at 810.
50. Id. The Dushman court appears to have adopted the common law challenges for cause directly
from Blackstone. See 3 BLAcKsTONE's CoimNTARIES ON Tm LAws OF ENoLAND 363 (W. Lewis 1902).
51. It is possible to categorize the eighth cause, employment by, or relationship to a person
employed by, a prosecutorial arm of government in a criminal case, as simply a variation of the
traditional master-servant exclusion found in Dushman. This author chooses to treat the exclusion as
a separate one because the exclusion extends in certain circumstances beyond those who are themselves
employees to those who are connected in various ways to such employees. See discussion of this dis-
qualification below.
52. See, e.g., State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900) (supreme court upheld the
exclusion of persons who were the defendant's cousins and in-laws).
53. State v. Beckett, 310 S.E.2d 883, 888 (W. Va. 1983) (citing State v. Kilpatrick, 158 W. Va.
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challenge. For example, when a juror is related to a member of a
party's family through marriage, the court treats these and similar
cases not like challenges for cause under kinship (technically there
is no relationship to a party) but as challenges to the favor, affirming
in the reported cases the trial court's exercise of discretion in ex-
cluding the juror.5 4 Similarly, when a juror is employed by a member
of a party's family, the court turns not to the kinship disqualification
but to the disqualification for having an interest in the cause.5 Lastly,
the supreme court has refused to create a blanket kinship disqual-
ification ground governing a juror's consanguineal relationship to a
witness.5 6 Here again, the standard is interest in the cause.57
b. An Arbitrator for Either Party.
The purpose of the exclusion of an arbitrator for either party is
to prevent a person who has acted as an arbitrator in a dispute from
sitting again as a fact finder in the trial court. This exclusion certainly
makes good sense, for arbitrators often employ different evidentiary
standards than those employed in a jury trial, thus exposing the
arbitrator to evidence not admissible in a trial court.5 8 Moreover, an
arbitrator would probably have a clear opinion at the start of trial
regarding liability.
The reference to "either party" is unclear. It may be taken to
mean either that the juror who has served as an arbitrator in an ex
parte hearing in the same dispute is disqualified or that an arbitrator
who has served one party in other, and perhaps similar, contexts is
disqualified. There are no reported West Virginia cases elaborating
upon this exclusion.
54. See, e.g., Pardee v. Johnson, 70 W. Va. 387, 74 S.E. 721 (1912) (excluding a juror related
to the grantor of plaintiffs land in an ejectment action); State v. McCauseland, 82 W. Va. 525, 96
S.E. 938 (1918) (excluding juror who was a brother-in-law of the accused's brother); State v. Ginanni,
328 S.E.2d 187 (1985) (excluding a juror whose former spouse's sister was married to the defendant).
55. Wilcox, 286 S.E.2d 257, 258-59. See discussion of interest in the cause below.
56. See discussion above, however.
57. See State v. Wilson, 157 W. Va. 1036, 207 S.E. 2d 174, 180 (1974) (court upheld the trial
court's refusal to ask whether any jurors were related to any witnesses subpoenaed by the state). It
is doubtful that Wilson and State v. Harris, 69 W. Va. 244, 71 S.E. 609 (1911) (holding that it was
not improper to retain a juror who was related to the spouse of the prosecuting witness), survive
Kilpatrick.
58. M. HnL & A. SiNmcRoPI, EVEDENCE iN ARBTRATION 3-5 (2d ed. 1987).
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c. Interest in the Cause.
There is no clear definition in the case law of what it means for
a juror to have "an interest in the cause.' ' 59 If this category is to
have a meaning that is independent from the challenge to the favor,
however, it must be taken to contemplate situations in which the
juror would be assumed, rather than proven, to be partial. Thus, a
classic case in the commentaries of "interest in the cause" involves
pecuniary interest, such as the interest of a stockholding juror who
is asked to sit as a fact finder in a case in which his company is a
party. Such jurors are "ordinarily incompetent to sit as jurors in the
action. "6
The real issue in this area, however, is what degree of interest
should cause the court to move the challenge from the favor cate-
gory, in which bias or prejudice actually must be proven, to the
cause category, in which bias or prejudice are assumed, de jure, to
exist.6 1 The difficulty of this problem, especially in sparsely populated
areas, is illustrated by West Virginia Department of Highways v.
Fisher. In Fisher, the West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's decision not to grant cause disqualifications for thirteen pro-
spective jurors, all of whom had various relationships with a well-
known country doctor and his witnesses in a condemnation case and
some of whom were actually patients of the doctor. The court held:
[Where a physician-patient relationship exists between a party to the litigation and
a prospective juror, although such prospective juror is not disqualified per se,
special care should be taken to ascertain, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 56-6-12
[1931], that such prospective juror is free from bias or prejudice.62
Thus, while the court did not squarely put juror-patients in the in-
terest-for-cause category, it came close to doing so. As a result, it
59. The West Virginia Supreme Court itself has noted this lack of clarity in State v. Beckett,
310 S.E.2d 883, 887 (V. Va. 1983).
The reader should note that this ground is contained not only in the decisional law, see Dushman,
above, but is also contained in the statutory law. See W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966).
60. See W. JoRDAN, supra note 7, at 92.
61. "While interest in a case to such an extent as naturally to lead to an inference of bias
disqualifies one as juror in that case, it is nevertheless difficult to rule generally as to just when, under
particular circumstances, one has such an interest." 47 Am. JuR. 2D Jury § 272 (1969).
62. West Virginia Department of Highways v. Fisher, 289 S.E.2d 213, 220 (%V. Va. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982); Abofreka v. Alston Tobacco Co., 288 S.C. 122, 341 S.E.2d 622 (1986).
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appears that such jurors will be presumed partial unless otherwise
demonstrated.
However, Fisher remains unique. The supreme court has resisted
appeals to insert other categories of jurors in the interest-for-cause
category or even to give them the special treatment the Fisher court
did. For example, the supreme court has refused to approve removal
of labor union members for interest in a criminal case brought in
the context of a dispute among various union forces for control of
the workforce. 6 Likewise, it has refused to find juror-depositors dis-
qualified for interest in a case involving the banking institutions in
which they were depositors. 64
The West Virginia Supreme Court's resistance to expanding the
interest-in-the-cause disqualification category is understandable but
nonetheless disappointing. It is costly to pay a juror not to serve. 65
Courts undoubtedly prefer to have fewer rather than more a priori
disqualifications simply because it is less expensive and less time-
consuming. Courts must surely know, however, that the appearance
of impropriety is often as damaging as actual impropriety. 66 When
a juror who may have an ax to grind against a rival union or who
may expect favored treatment at a bank is allowed to serve, the
appearance of impropriety is created and public trust is threatened.
In such circumstances, there should be no hesitation in choosing
public confidence in the justice system over the efficient use of state
tax dollars on utilitarian grounds alone.67 The supply of the latter
63. State v. Woolridge, 129 W. Va. 448, 464, 40 S.E.2d 899, 908 (1946).
64. Community Bank & Trust v. Keyser, 285 S.E.2d 424, 432 (W. Va. 1981).
65. West Virginia Code § 52-2-17(a) (1986) requires that jurors be paid between fifteen and forty
dollars for each day of required attendance, plus their travel costs.
66. To maintain [the jury] system in the respect and affection of the citizens of this country
it is requisite that the jurors chosen should not only in fact be fair and impartial, but that
they should not comply such relation to either side as to lead on that account to any doubt
on that subject.
Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 195 (1908).
67. The object of the law is to secure jurors whose minds are wholly free from bias or
prejudice for or against the accused. State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561, 37 S.E. 626 (1900),
This is the very basis for the great weight and sanctity given to their verdicts. Those who
administer the law must respect its wise and salutary rules of procedure, in order that like
respect for law and order may be inspired in others . . ..
State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241, 245, 128 S.E. 373, 374, 40 A.L.R. 608 (1925).
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depends in considerable part on the health of the former. More im-
portantly, expediency, as the West Virginia Supreme Court itself has
said, is not the true measure of justice.
d. An Action is Pending Between the Juror and a Party.
Because the implication of prejudice is so strong where an action
is pending between a juror and a party, the wisdom of this rule is
completely self-evident. No reported cases elaborating on this point
exist in West Virginia.68
e. The Juror has Taken Money for His or Her Verdict.
Without doubt, this was the Dushman court's attempt at humor.
However, every lawyer knows the value of authority. If one wants
to remove a prospective juror whom the other side has bribed, here
is all the authority one needs.
f. The Juror was Formerly a Juror in the Same Case.
The historical origins of this rule in West Virginia are rooted in
the peculiar situation in which a person who is called for petit jury
service has already served in the grand jury for the very same case.
State v. McDonald sets forth the traditional rule that governs in such
circumstances:
If it appears that a man (sic) summoned as a juror, for the trial of a prisoner
has been upon the grand jury that found the indictment, he must be rejected.
The unmistakable motivation for the general rule proscribing re-
peated same-case service is to allow the parties to a lawsuit, whether
68. The West Virginia Supreme Court, in Wagoner v. Iaeger, 49 W. Va. 61, 38 S.E. 528 (1901),
did not squarely rule on this disqualification but seemed, with quite good and evident reason, to assume
that the rule obtained. (The appellant, who had objected after the verdict to the juror's service, was
not heard to complain in the supreme court because "by the exercise of ordinary diligence [he] could
certainly have ascertained [prior to trial] that the juror was a defendant in a . . . suit brought by
himself . . . ." Id. at 63, 38 S.E. at 529.) The obviousness of the reason for the rule did not prevent
Justice Musmanno of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court from waxing elegant on it. See Darlington Brick
and Mining Co. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 407 Pa. 660, 182 A.2d 524 (1962).
69. State v. McDonald, 9 W. Va. 456, 465 (1876). See also State v. Cooper, 74 W. Va. 472,
474-75, 83 S.E. 358, 359 (1914). Cf. State v. Jones, 128 W. Va. 496, 501, 37 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1946).
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criminal or civil, the opportunity to write on a clean slate. The desire
to achieve this effect is a recurring theme in jury selection law. It
is not surprising, therefore, to find that the rule against repeated
same-case service comes into play in other important contexts as well.
For example, especially in sparsely populated rural counties there
is a real possibility that a juror who once sat on a particular case
may be called to sit on a retrial of the same case occurring as the
result of a mistrial or a successful appeal. Surely it would be ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, for such a juror to enter the
second trial with the required impartiality. 70 While there are no re-
ported West Virginia cases on this point, the majority rule with re-
spect to service on both a trial and a retrial is understandably quite
clear: repeated service is forbidden whether the case is criminal or
civil in nature. 7
1
There have been attempts to extend this exclusion to circum-
stances in which the prospective juror is asked to hear not the same
case but the same or similar evidence in a later proceeding. Until
recently, the West Virginia Supreme Court has been firm in its un-
willingness to recognize the exclusion in such circumstances. For ex-
ample, in State v. Carduff2 the court refused to find that a juror
who would have heard evidence for the second time when a defen-
70. Denial of a challenge based on this ground would probably be a deprivation of the
constitutional right to jury trial. There is not much doubt that a juror who has sat on former
trial of the same case, either to verdict or to a point at which a mistrial was declared, would
not have a virgin mind with respect to the issues in the second trial of that case.
W. JoRDAN, supra note 7, at 84. See Annotation, Juror's Presence At or Participation in Trial of
Criminal Case (or Related Hearing) as Ground of Disqualification in Subsequent Criminal Case In-
volving Same Defendant, 6 A.L.R.3d 519, 542 (1966).
71. W. JoRDAN, supra note 7, at 84-85. See also Annotation, supra note 70 at 541 (stating that
"in most instances particular jurors or prospective jurors have been held disqualified").
Prior to State v. Van Metre, 343 S.E.2d 450 (W. Va. 1986) (see text associated with footnotes
81-84, infra), State v. Dephenbaugh, 106 W. Va. 289, 145 S.E. 634 (1928) made it less than clear that
West Virginia would follow the majority rule. In Dephenbaugh, a prospective juror had heard some
testimony in the first trial of the case, apparently as a spectator. The same juror even admitted to
having partially made up his mind. Because the trial court, with the assistance of a leading question,
was able to coax the juror into saying his decision would be governed by the evidence, the Supreme
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's refusal to dismiss the juror. (This example of the court's
refusal to excuse a clearly prejudiced juror when the trial court puts the proper words in his mouth
is astonishing, but typical. For other examples of the court closing its eyes to bias and prejudice in
similar situations, see Part C(4), below.)
72. Carduff, 142 W. Va. 18, 93 S.E.2d 502.
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dant different than the defendant in the first trial was in the dock
should have been removed on that basis alone. 73 The Carduff court
believed that some showing of actual partiality must be made in order
to sustain a challenge to such a juror.7 4 Likewise, in State v. Riley75
the court would not infer bias or prejudice when grand jurors who
participated in the indictment of a defendant on one charge were
later available to serve as petit jurors in a case against the same
defendant on a different but similar charge. 76 The Riley court, too,
said that actual prejudice must be demonstrated. 77
Even when the juror whose service is in issue falls squarely in
the traditional category of same-case service, there has been no as-
surance that the failure to exclude such a person would be ruled
reversible error. This is so because the Riley court narrowed this
ground for challenge for cause by creating a harmless error rule:
[E]ven if a member of the petit jury was a member of the grand jury which returned
the indictment, and the entire record shows that the defendant had a fair and
impartial trial, such disqualification would not warrant setting aside the verdict of
the jury. 8
Such a position, of course, begs the question. Nearly every juror,
when asked whether he or she could be fair and impartial in the
second proceeding, is going to answer affirmatively out of a desire
to follow the constitutional rules that require a presumption of in-
73. Id. at 41, 93 S.E.2d at 516. See also State v. Koski, 101 W. Va. 477, 133 S.E. 79 (1926).
74. Carduff, 142 W. Va. at 41, 93 S.E.2d at 516.
75. State v. Riley, 151 W. Va. 764, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1967).
76. Id. at 380-83, 151 S.E.2d at 320-22.
77. Id. In a third case, State v. Taft, 183 W. Va. 332, 102 S.E.2d 152 (1958), aff'd., 144 W.
Va. 704, 110 S.E.2d 727 (1959), the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to invalidate the trial court's
refusal to strike prospective jurors who had been in the courtroom to hear some evidence against the
same defendant stemming from the same facts.
In State v. Chariot, 157 W. Va. 994, 206 S.E.2d 908 (1974), the court refused to find those jurors
disqualified who had served on a number of similar trials in the same term in which the prosecution
employed the same key witnesses as those it intended to employ against the defendant. The court relied
upon Carduff and Riley for authority.
The reader should note that even though prior service is not always an adequate ground for a
challenge for cause, a party is entitled to individual voir dire to determine the existence of actual bias
or prejudice. State v. Toney, 302 S.E.2d 815, 818 (W. Va. 1983).
78. Riley, 151 W. Va. at 381, 151 S.E.2d at 321.
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nocence.79 Anyone who has spent five minutes in a courtroom, how-
ever, knows that most first-time jurors believe that the defendant
would not be in court unless he or she has done something wrong.
They credit the state. How heightened is this feeling when a person
whom the jurors have already convicted once for another crime or
indicted for the offense they are now trying appears before them?
What fallible human being would extend to such a defendant his or
her complete and unsullied right to the presumption of innocence?
The Riley court's position is disingenuous because the question to
be decided here is not whether such a juror will admit to actual
bias-he or she likely will not-but whether our common experience
teaches us that such jurors are in fact tainted and, thus, should be
excluded on grounds of implied prejudice.
It is quite clear that the supreme court has had an interest in
refusing to exclude such jurors on the basis of implied prejudice,
not because the court has a genuine belief that the jurors are actually
impartial but because empanelling different jurors would inconven-
ience the court. 80 In State v. Van Metre1 such pedestrian consid-
erations gave way to what Justice Harlan Calhoun, in his stirring
dissent in Riley, called our "basic and fundamental . . . require-
ments of fair trials of criminal cases by impartial juries . .. 82
In Van Metre, several defendants were charged with the same
crime. They were to be tried separately. In order to serve judicial
economy, jurors for the three trials were all selected from the same
panel of twenty, resulting in a panel for Van Metre's case that held
nine jurors who had already heard the case against a co-indictee.
79. A number of modem commentators on juries have made this point. See generally S. HAMLIN,
WHAT MAKEs Jutias LisTEN? 36-41 (1985); Note, Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV.
1472, 1583-84 (1988); and Gold, Voir Dire: Questioning Jurors on Their Willingness to Follow the
Law, 60 IND. L. J. 164, 178 (1984) ("The assumption that jurors will follow the law appears to be
based primarily on wishful thinking.").
80. The court's bias in this direction was revealed in Carduff, 142 W. Va. at 39, 93 S.E.2d at
515, when it quoted this passage of Haussener v. United States, 4 F.2d 884 (8th Cir. 1925) with approval:
If, when one case has been tried, the entire panel of jurors sitting therein is disqualified
from sitting as jurors in every other case of a similar sort, trial courts will be so far impeded
in the transaction of their business as to make enforcement of [the Volstead Act] difficult,
if not impossible.
81. State v. Van Metre, 342 S.E.2d 450 (V. Va. 1986).
82. Riley, 151 W. Va. at 392, 151 S.E.2d at 329.
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The West Virginia Supreme Court perceived the situation as one
involving "a compelling case of possible juror bias" 83 and declared
the practice a violation of the constitutional "right to a fair and
impartial trial. ' 8 4 More important for future challenges than Van
Metre's holding, however, are the sentiments expressed by Mr. Justice
Neely at the conclusion of his opinion, for they attack the political
underpinning of so many of the court's earlier rulings in this area:
"When the demands for fair procedure conflict with the desirable
public policy of economy of effort and money, fair procedure pre-
vails." 85
g. The Juror is a Party's Master, Servant, Counsellor,
Steward, Attorney or "of the Same Corporation or Society."
i) The Juror Who is a Master or Servant of a Party.
It is undisputed that a juror who is the employer or employee
of a party is absolutely disqualified.86 This application of the rule
nicely illustrates the wisdom of the common law in creating dis-
qualifications on the basis of implied-in-law bias and prejudice. Justice
Rufus Peckham of the United States Supreme Court explains the
employment disqualification:
[T]he general tendency among men, recognized by the common law, [is] to look-
more favorably, though perhaps frequently unconsciously, upon the side of the
person or corporation that employs them, rather than upon the other side. Bias
or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most difficult, if
not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might exist in the mind
of one (on account of his relations with one of the parties) who was quite positive
that he had no bias, and said that he was perfectly able to decide the question
83. Van Metre, 342 S.E.2d at 451.
84. Id. at 452.
85. Some might argue that State v. Gargiliana, 138 W. Va. 376, 76 S.E.2d 265 (1953), rather
than Van Metre is the case that sets a new tone in this area. In Gargiliana the state supreme court
held that a juror who had been in the courtroom as a spectator during the same term and had heard
some evidence in a prosecution of the defendant for another violation of the same statute should have
been disqualified by the trial court. But this juror had also discussed the evidence with another and
answered voir dire questions about bias equivocally. Gargiliana, 135 W. Va. at 379, 76 S.E.2d at 267-
68. This additional and independent basis for the Gargiliana ruling distinguishes it from Van Metre.
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wholly uninfluenced by anything but the evidence. The law therefore most wisely
says that with regard to some of the relations which may exist between the juror
and one of the parties, bias is implied, and evidence of its actual existence need
not be given.Y
When the employer-juror relationship is particularly relevant to
the type of case being tried, the West Virginia Supreme Court has
occasionally been willing to extend the disqualification to situations
in which the employer was not actually a party. In State v. Dushman88
the court was faced with having to decide whether jurors who were
in the employ of a corporation should have bias implied to them in
a criminal prosecution of defendants accused of having received sto-
len goods belonging to the corporation. Because the court surmised
that the corporation had an interest in the result and that the em-
ployees would be under the corporation's influence, the court decided
to view the jurors as "presumptively subject to some bias or prej-
udice" and, therefore, challengeable for cause.8 9
A number of other cases in which the court has refused to find
implied-in-law bias or prejudice can only be explained by the relative
weakness the court found in the employer-juror relationship of the
particular case. These cases include White v. Lock,90 in which the
court ruled that a juror who shared an employer in common with
a party was not to be disqualified on the grounds of implied-in-law
bias;91 State v. Wilcox,92 in which the court refused to find that jurors
who were employed by the brother of a breaking-and-entering victim
fell into the cause category; 93 and State v. West, in which the court
refused to rule that all State and local government employees are
prima facie disqualified to sit as jurors in criminal cases. 94
87. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196 (1909) (emphasis supplied).
88. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809.
89. Id. The court reached the same result five years later in State v. Davis, 91 W. Va. 241, 112
S.E. 414 (1922). In Davis, the court referred to the juror-employees as "prima facie. . . disqualified."
90. White v. Lock, 332 S.E.2d 240, 243 (W. Va. 1985).
91. Id. (citing Woolridge, 129 W. Va. 448, 40 S.E.2d 899 (1946)). See also supra note 63 and
accompanying text for discussion of Woolridge.
92. Wilcox, 169 W. Va. 142, 286 S.E.2d 257.
93. Contrasting this case with Dushman and Davis, the court said "Here the challenged jurors
are farther removed from the parties to the proceeding and had no interest in the outcome." Wilcox,
169 W. Va. at 144, 286 S.E.2d at 259. The court says that the attorneys should have made an effort
to demonstrate favor but failed to do so. Id. at 145, 286 S.E.2d at 259.
94. State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209, 219, 200 S.E.2d 859, 865 (1982). See infra note 124 for
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ii) The Juror Who has an Attorney-Client Relationship With
a Party.
It is clear from the language used in the common law95 that a
juror who is an attorney for a party must be considered "absolutely"
disqualified.9 6 But what of the situation in which the juror is a client
of an attorney for a party? Is that, too, grounds for absolute dis-
qualification?
There is no clear answer in West Virginia on this point. As a
result of the West Virginia Supreme Court's decision in State v.
Audia,97 however, it appears that West Virginia is in accord with the
majority rule that "in the absence of a controlling statute, a juror
is not disqualified in either a criminal or civil case for past or present
professional or business relations with an attorney in the case.''98
The ambiguity in West Virginia has been created because Audia
did not squarely present the issue to the court. In Audia a prospective
juror in a criminal action was being represented by the prosecuting
attorney in a partition suit in which the attorney was also representing
thirty to forty other family members. The prospective juror had never
met the prosecutor and did not even know that the prosecutor was
the family's lawyer.
The court rejected the appellant-defendant's argument that bias
should be implied as a matter of law, saying:
We find no prejudice, per se, in the attorney-client relationship between the pros-
ecutor and [the juror], particularly where, as here, the representation is of a class
95. A principal cause of challenge, prima facie disqualifying a juror, is "that he is the party's
counselor . . .or attorney .... " Dushman, 79 W. Va. 749, 91 S.E. at 810.
96. Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 195 (1908).
97. State v. Audia, 301 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 934 (1983).
98. W. JoRuAsi supra note 7 (citing, inter alia, People v. Wilkes, 44 Cal.2d 679, 284 P.2d 481
(1955); State v. Ekis, 2 Kan. App. 2d 658, 586 P.2d 288 (Kan. 1978); Bailey v. McLeod, 143 Kan.
638, 56 P.2d 460 (1936); Whitney v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 292 Ky. 381, 177 S.W.2d 139 (1944);
Eikenberry v. McFal, 33 Ohio Abs. 525, 36 N.E.2d 27 (1941); Border v. Carrabine, 30 Okla. 740,
120 P. 1087 (1912); State v. Glover, 41 S.D. 465, 113 N.W. 625 (1907); Lumberman's Ins. Co. v.
Goodman, 304 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957); and Harrison v. Missouri-Kansas & TR Co., 89
S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (error dismissed); Kagele v. Frederick, 43 Wash.2d 410, 261 P.2d
699 (1953); State v. Lewis, 31 Wash. 75, 71 P. 778 (1903); and Redwine v. Fitzhugh, 78 Wyo. 407,
329 P.2d 257 (1958)). See also Annotation, Professional or Business Relations Between Proposed Juror
and Attorney as Ground for Challenge for Cause, 52 A.L.R.4th 964 (1987).
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of people and he has little, if any, contact with the particular individual who is
the juror.99
The court went on to hold that:
[W]here a prospective juror is one of a class of persons represented by the pros-
ecuting attorney at the time of trial, but there has been no actual contact between
that juror and the prosecutor, the existence of the attorney-client relationship alone
is not prima facie grounds for disqualification of that juror.'1°
Can we conclude from Audia that the supreme court will not find
the attorney-client relationship grounds for absolute cause disqual-
ification in the more typical context in which the prospective juror
is being represented by an attorney for a party and has a typically
close relationship with the attorney? Or should we conclude that the
court will simply articulate a sliding scale rule, under the terms of
which the level of scrutiny of the relationship is proportionate to the
closeness of the relationship? The reasoning and holding in Audia
appear to have been drawn with great care so that this issue could
be decided another day.
However the court decides, it will be well-advised to reject the
premise of the majority rule. 11 It appears to be contrary to common
human experience. It asks us to believe that a juror who has entrusted
a legal matter to an attorney can suspend for the duration of the
juror's service the special confidence that juror has demonstrated in
the attorney. Moreover, the premise asks us to believe that the juror
will not be influenced in his or her decision-making by thoughts of
the consequences on the well-being of the juror's own case of a vote
against the interests of his or her attorney. As Judge Walter Jordan
has said, because the juror who can put aside such considerations
is rare, such a juror should be disqualified.10 2
99. Audia, 301 S.E.2d at 205-06 (emphasis supplied).
100. Id.
101. The majority rule appears to be losing some support as the trend of authority is to
exclude from juries all persons who by reason of their business or social relations, past or
present with either of the parties, could be suspected of possible bias, even though the par-
ticular status or relation is not enumerated in the statutes declaring the qualifications of
jurors and the grounds of challenge.
47 Am. JuR. 2D, Jury § 321 (1969).
102. W. JoRDAN, supra note 7, at 98. It appears from the context of Judge Jordan's remarks
that he means for such jurors to be absolutely disqualified for cause.
[Vol. 91
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Unfortunately, the West Virginia Supreme Court's latest decision
in this area appears to continue West Virginia's embrace of the un-
realistic appraisal of human nature that supports the majority rule.
The appellant in State v Nixon'0 3 argued that a juror who was a
litigant in an ongoing domestic relations dispute in which the de-
fendant's attorney was representing the juror's former spouse'04 should
be disqualified for cause. The Nixon court rejected this position,
clearly implying that such a juror will be dismissed only on a showing
of actual prejudice or bias. 105 The distressing levels of animosity that
often accompany involvement in domestic relations litigation are too
well known. Also well known are the lengths to which jurors will
go to establish themselves in the eyes of the court and their colleagues
as fair persons. Given these realities, the supreme court would be
well-advised to give some reconsideration to the basis of its decision
in Nixon.
iii) The Juror Who is "of the Same Corporation or Society".
This disqualifying ground, like all the others grounds described
in Dushman, was apparently taken directly from Mr. Justice Black-
stone's Commentaries by the Dushman Court. 06 Unfortunately, nei-
ther Blackstone, the Dushman court, nor any West Virginia Court
The Alabama Supreme Court has taken the minority position, finding that a juror ought to have
bias implied to him when his attorney, in a contingency fee case, is representing a party in a case the
juror would hear if chosen to serve. Alabama explicitly rejects the position that such a juror should
be examined for actual bias. Price v. State, 383 So. 2d 884, 887 (Ala. 1980), cert. denied, 383 So. 2d
888 (Ala. 1980). But cf., Albright v. Wood, Inc. v. Wallace, 274 Ala. 317, 148 So. 2d 240 (1962),
and Harris v. State, 46 Ala. App. 497, 243 So. 2d 770 (1970). See also Frank v. United States, 59
F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1932) (holding that the trial court did not err in excusing a prospective juror when
the relation of attorney and client existed between defense counsel and the prospective juror), and
Christiancy v. State, 106 Neb. 822, 184 N.W. 948 (1921) (holding that the sustaining of the State's
challenge to a prospective juror was not error when the prospective juror had a case pending in which
the defense counsel was his attorney).
103. State v. Nixon, 359 S.E.2d 566 (W. Va. 1987).
104. A conversation with the defendant's attorney adds some detail to the court's description of
the situation. The defendant's attorney was representing the juror's ex-wife in an ongoing and long-
standing dispute over child support and custody. The trial transcript indicates that there was at least
one modification petition pending at the time of the Nixon trial. Telephone interview with Kevin Burgess
(July 22, 1988).
105. Id. In response to questions from the trial judge, the juror said he could be fair.
106. See 3 W. BLACKSTOaN'S COMMENTAIES ON Tm LAws OF ENcLAD 363 (V. Lewis 1902).
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since has offered any suggestion as to the scope of this disqualifi-
cation.
The majority rule that prospective jurors who are stockholders
of corporations that are parties are disqualified from serving is clear. 07
There appears to be no reason to believe this rule would not be
applied in West Virginia. The more difficult question associated with
this disqualification ground concerns the situation in which a party
and a prospective juror share membership in a common organization,
such as a labor union or fraternal organization.
A simple application of the plain meaning of the text of Dushman
would result in the disqualification of such persons, but the textual
meaning has been implicitly rejected in West Virginia and elsewhere.
In State v. Woolridge,08 the West Virginia Supreme Court rejected
the argument, without reference to the "same corporation or society"
ground, that one labor union member could not sit on a jury hearing
a riot charge involving members of a rival union when all were em-
ployees of the same corporation. The court appeared to take the
position that because the employer, the Weirton Steel Company, had
no real interest in the outcome of the prosecution for a riot that
threatened the company's property and because the workforce for
whose loyalty the two unions were competing numbered 10,000 per-
sons, the possibility of actual sympathy or prejudice on the part of
the prospective jurors was negligible. Aside from being completely
unrealistic in its assessment of the interest businesses have in the
integrity of their property and union control of the workforce, this
reasoning is wholly inconsistent with that employed by the court in
Dushman'09 and Davis.110 In any event, the important point is that
the "same corporation or society" ground was ignored.
If membership in the same corporation does not always dis-
qualify, then what of membership in the same society? West Virginia
107. W. JoRDAN, supra note 7, at 92. The rule is typically treated as stemming from the interest-
in-the-cause disqualification rather than the "same corporation" ground.
108. Wooridge, 129 W. Va. 448, 40 S.E.2d 889 (1946), discussed above in text associated with
footnote 63.
109. State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809 (1917).
110. State v. Davis, 91 W. Va. 241, 112 S.E. 414 (1922).
[Vol. 91
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has not ruled on this question, but for years other courts have ig-
nored the language of the ground. One of the earliest cases to do
so, Purple v. Horton,111 is prototypical. In Purple the defendant
claimed that, because the plaintiff and some of the prospective jurors
were Masons, the "same society" grounds should serve to disqualify
the prospective jury members.
The court conducted a purposive analysis of the grounds in these
terms:
Tlhe reason assigned for excluding as jurors all persons [who fall into cause cat-
egories] is because the challenge for cause carries with it prima facie evident marks
of suspicion, either of malice or favor. Is it true that persons belonging to the
same society or corporation are ipso facto prejudiced in favor of every person
belonging to the same society or corporation, so that they can not decide a question
of fact between them and other persons? Whatever may have been the state of
society in the days of Finch and Blackstone, it is not so now. This rule would
exclude every stockholder in the same bank, every member of the same church,
and every associate of the same benevolent society. We have many societies in
which the members are extremely numerous, who have never heard of each other,
and can have no inducements to favor persons who may belong to the same society,
in preference to other individuals.l"
If this approach to social and benevolent organizations resonated
with common sense in 1834, it still holds true for today's larger
population, with its proliferation of large voluntary associations and
the resulting rise in anonymity. The courts are right to treat chal-
lenges on this ground as if they were challenges to the favor, which
require a showing of actual bias or prejudice.
113
h. The Juror Who, in a Criminal Case, is a Member of the
Law Enforcement Community.
In 1973, the West Virginia Supreme Court added an eighth dis-
qualification ground to the traditional grounds articulated some sixty-
111. Purple v. Horton, 27 Am. Dec. 167, 13 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1834).
112. Id.
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six years earlier in Dushman."4 In State v. West,"5 an appeal by a
defendant convicted of larceny, the court held that "it is reversible
error to permit a challenged juror who is an employee of the De-
partment of Public Safety [the State Police], a law enforcement arm
of the state, to be a member of the panel of twenty."'" 6 The relevant
syllabus point broadened this exclusion to say that "in a criminal
case it is reversible error for a trial court to overrule a challenge for
cause of a juror who is an employee of a prosecutorial or enforce-
ment agency of the State of West Virginia."" 7
The West decision is commendable for its insightful and realistic
view of human nature. The court frankly admits that subtle forces
work on human nature to result in our viewing, often unconsciously,
certain sides of a dispute more favorably than others." 8 Simply by
virtue of his or her association with law enforcement, for example,
a prospective juror is "subject to potential prejudice" and ought to
be disqualified without the use of a peremptory challenge." 9 This is
precisely the reason the common law initially established cause chal-
lenges-because under some circumstances, in which human frailty
is clearly brought into play, our common experience tells us that
conscious, but more often unconscious, prejudice and bias take up
residence in prospective jurors.
114. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 915 S.E. 809. The text of the opinion might give some grounds
to argue that the State v. West court was simply elaborating upon Dushman's disqualification of those
prospective jurors with a master-servant relationship with a party. The court does, in fact, cite Dushman
for this fact and quotes Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183 (1909), for authority for the proposition
that a prospective juror employed by the government is a servant of one of the parties. If this were
all the court had said on cause disqualifications, one might conclude that the master-servant ground
was the basis of the West decision. But the court goes on not only to speak of kinship, interest, and
same-society or corporation grounds, but it also seemingly disqualifies not only employees but those
persons connected, not necessarily by kinship alone, to employees. See discussion of West and its
progeny at notes 125 and 126.
115. State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209, 200 S.E.2d 859 (1973).
116. Id. at 219, 200 S.E.2d at 865. The panel of twenty, referred to here by the court, refers to
those jurors who remain after all but peremptory challenges are exercised.
117. Id. at 216, 200 S.E.2d 861 (1973). Syllabus points of opinions published by the West Virginia
Supreme Court are part of the court's constitutional duty. See W. VA. CoNsT. art. XIII, §4. As for
the force they carry, see Note, Courts - The Syllabus In West Virginia - Law or Official Headnote?
58 W. VA. L. REv. 274 (1956).
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The supreme court easily could have ended its opinion with the
disqualification of employees of the prosecutorial and law enforce-
ment arms of state government. Instead, however, it continued:
[Wihen the defendant can demonstrate even a tenuous relationship between a pro-
spective juror and any prosecutorial or enforcement arm of State government,
defendant's challenge for cause should be sustained by the court .... [D]oubt
must be resolved in favor of the defendant's challenge, as jurors who have no
relation to the State are readily available.m
Over the next fifteen years, this language was to cause serious def-
initional problems for the court in two areas: One, who is an em-
ployee of a law enforcement arm of the state? Two, what are the
contours of the "tenuous" relationships that will disqualify pro-
spective jurors having them?
The supreme court has begun to address the first question in a
series of cases in which it has held that magistrates, 12 secretaries to
circuit judges, 22 employees of the Department of Human Services,
23
and arson investigators' 24 are not part of the enforcement system for
the purposes of the exclusion, but city police25 and K-9 correctional
officers who assist law enforcement personnel are.12 6
The court has followed a more tortuous path in resolving the
second, and more difficult, question. Here, the court's troubles were
120. Id. at 220, 200 S.E.2d at 866 (emphasis supplied).
121. State v. Maynard, 289 S.E.2d 714, 719 (W. Va. 1982). The court reasoned that a magistrate,
unlike an individual in law enforcement, is concerned with the "disinterested resolution of disputes,"
and therefore the reasoning which causes enforcement personnel to be treated as presumptively dis-
qualified does not apply to magistrates.
122. State v. Brown, 355 S.E.2d 614, 620 (,V. Va. 1987).
123. State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 46, 51 n.7 (V. Va. 1987). In Bailey, the employee was a social
worker whose job brought her into contact with the office of the prosecutor in child placements and
home investigations. While the juror's division investigated the defendant, the juror disclaimed any
knowledge of the case. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d at 50.
124. State v Worley, 369 S.E.2d 706 (V. Va. 1988) (petition for certiorari filed August 11, 1988).
How can a part-time arson investigator, employed by the fire department, not be a member of a law
enforcement agency? Arson is a crime. Fire officials investigate arson because it is a crime. Perhaps
the court in Worley was reluctant to find that the arson investigator's job fit within the category of
"law enforcement" because there was no other substantive error in Worley's trial to disturb the con-
viction. Perhaps, too, the court is uncomfortable with the cause exclusion of law enforcement personnel
but is not comfortable in overturning West entirely.
125. State v. Dye, 167 W. Va. 652, 653, 280 S.E.2d 323, 324 (1981). Apparently the State had
argued that West applied only to state enforcement officials. Dye makes it clear that all enforcement
officials are to be included in the ambit of the exclusion.
126. State v. Simmons, 301 S.E.2d 812, 813 (W. Va. 1983).
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caused, at least in part, by the impression it gave in West, perhaps
inadvertently, that one who had "even a tenuous relationship" with
law enforcement was presumptively disqualified, just as a juror who
was personally employed by a law enforcement agency was pre-
sumptively, automatically, and absolutely disqualified. 127
The nature of the relationship disqualification first appeared as
an issue in State v. Pratt.'1 In Pratt, a number of prospective jurors
indicated that they had relationships with enforcement personnel. The
defendant's attorney sought to question these jurors about their re-
lationships, but the trial court refused the request. In finding the
court's refusal an abuse of discretion, the West Virginia Supreme
Court ruled that the trial court should have either allowed the ques-
tioning (which is what the defendant's counsel sought) or simply
excused the jurors. The clear implication of the Pratt court's pro-
viding this second option seems to be that one who is related to
enforcement personnel can be treated as removable for cause, with-
out resort to the challenge for favor or the peremptory strike. 29
In a pair of cases following Pratt, the court held, without ex-
tensive discussion, that a juror who was a close friend of the pros-
ecutor and his spouse and whose own spouse was a candidate for
sheriff13° and a juror whose son was in law enforcement work 3' were
each disqualified by reasons of the West relationship test.
Then in a pair of 1983 cases, the West Virginia Supreme Court
began to trim the definition of "tenuous relationship." In State v.
White132 it refused to classify two jurors as coming within the re-
127. It may be helpful here to keep in mind the distinction made earlier in this paper between
challenges for cause and challenges for favor. Had the West court denominated employees themselves
as challengeable for cause and those with relationships to employees as challengeable for favor, much
of the ensuing confusion about the status of those with relationships would have been easily prevented.
128. State v. Pratt, 161 W. Va. 530, 538, 244 S.E.2d 227, 233-34 (1978).
129. Indeed, the implication is that there was no need for the defendant's counsel or the court
to continue questioning the prospective jurors after they had identified themselves as related to law
enforcement personnel.
130. State v. Payne, 167 W. Va. 252, 257, 280 S.E.2d 72, 76 (1981).
131. State v. Archer, 169 W. Va. 564, 564, 289 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1982). Later, in State v. Maynard,
289 S.E.2d 714, 719 (V. Va. 1982), the court reinforced the relationship disqualification it had created
when it read Archer as holding that "the near relatives of law enforcement officers should not serve
on panels for criminal trials."
132. State v. White, 301 S.E.2d 617, 618 (W. Va. 1983).
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lationship test. One juror "knew" a state trooper involved in the
case "socially." Another juror, who was a former deputy sheriff,
knew two of the enforcement officers involved in the case through
his former employment. In State v. Meadows 133 the court ruled that
a prospective juror who ten years earlier had been sporadically em-
ployed as a prison guard also did not meet the relationship test.
At this point, the court must have sensed that an expansive read-
ing of its "even a tenuous relationship" test was making it difficult
to select criminal juries, for in State v. Beckett3 4 the court dra-
matically changed direction. While persons in the actual employ of
a law enforcement agency were to remain absolutely disqualified,
Beckett announced a new rule for persons related to such employees:
[A] prospective juror's consanguineal, marital or social relationship with an em-
ployee of a law enforcement agency does not operate as a per se disqualification
for cause in a criminal case unless the law enforcement official is actively involved
in the prosecution of the case. "'
Thus, the court has now made it crystal clear that a challenge
on the basis of the relationship test is a challenge to the favor, re-
quiring a demonstration of actual bias or prejudice, and not a chal-
lenge for cause, requiring automatic removal. The only exception to
this rule is in the case of a prospective juror whose relationship is
with someone directly involved with the case at hand. 136 Such a per-
son, apparently, is challengeable for cause. 37
133. State v. Meadows, 304 S.E.2d 831, 841 (W. Va. 1983).
134. State v. Beckett, 310 S.E.2d 883 (V. Va. 1983).
135. Id. at 889. The court claims in its opinion to have "consistently" treated the relationship
disqualification as one that requires a showing of actual bias or prejudice. Id. But the court's decision
in Archer, which the court does not mention in Beckett, shows otherwise.
136. Syllabus points 2 and 4 of Beckett, read as follows:
2. "When a prospective juror is closely related by consanguinity to a prosecuting witness or
to a witness for the prosecution, who has taken an active part in the prosecution or is
particularly interested in the result, he should be excluded upon the motion of the adverse
party." Syllabus Point 1, State v. Kilpatrick, W. Va., 210 S.E.2d 480 (1974).
4. A potential juror closely related by blood or marriage to either the prosecuting or defense
attorneys involved in the case or to any members of their respective staffs or firms should
automatically be disqualified.
Beckett, 310 S.E.2d at 883.
137. Again, this rule is not obvious from the West decision, as the Beckett opinion might have
one believe. In West the court referred to jurors having "even a tenuous relationship" with "any
prosecutorial or enforcement arm of State government .... " State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209, 219,
200 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1973) (emphasis supplied).
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In keeping with this clarified approach, the supreme court has
emphasized that those parties challenging jurors who might be ex-
cused on favor grounds are entitled to individual voir dire'38 to de-
termine the existence or nonexistence of actual bias or prejudice. 3 9
Recently, however, the court has held that this right is somewhat
limited. Although the court may exercise its discretion to ask a broader
range of questions, it is required only to ask "each juror who . . .
is related to a law enforcement official whether that relationship
would bias him against the accused in any way.' 140
In the decisions following Beckett, the court has adhered to the
principles articulated there.1
41
C. Challenges to the Favor.
To this point, we have discussed two types of challenges: chal-
lenges for cause and challenges to the array. Our system also allows
a third type of challenge, known in the elegant language of our older
cases as the "challenge to the favor.' ' t42 This challenge permits parties
to seek the removal of unlimited numbers of jurors by motion when,
138. See discussion of the meaning of individual voir dire at part two.
139. State v. Ashcraft, 309 S.E.2d 600, 609 (W. Va. 1983); State v. Beckett, 310 S.E.2d 883,
889 (W. Va. 1983), State v. Worley, 369 S.E.2d 706, 719 (W. Va. 1988).
140. State v. Lassiter, 354 S.E.2d 595, 600 (,V. Va. 1987), overruling recognized by State v.
Haselton, 371 S.E.2d 366 (W. Va. 1988). One might reasonably ask whether such a limited inquiry
can probe the juror's mind sufficiently to determine the actual presence or absence of prejudice or
bias. See discussion of questioning in Part Two.
141. See Jordan v. Holland, 324 S.E.2d 372, 378 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Wade, 327 S.E. 2d
142, 147 (W. Va. 1985); State v. Brown, 355 S.E.2d 614, 620 (W. Va. 1987); State v. Perdue, 372
S.E.2d 636 (W. Va. 1988). In State v. Bailey, 365 S.E.2d 46 (V. Va. 1987), this rule is announced:
[w]here a prospective juror, who is not an employee of a prosecutorial agency, indicates
during voir dire that her employment involves work with the prosecutor's office, there is no
error in the trial court's refusal to strike the prospective juror for cause absent a showing
on the record of bias or prejudice or a [refused] request by counsel for individual voir dire
to determine whether such bias or prejudice actually exists.
Id. at 51. See also State v. Lassiter, 354 S.E.2d 595 (W. Va. 1987).
142. Thompson v. Douglass and Co., 35 W. Va. 337, 338, 13 S.E. 1015, 1016 (1891). Thompson
offers this distinction between cause and favor challenges:
Challenges for cause are divided by the common law into challenges for principal cause and
challenges to the favor,-the former being where the cause assigned positively disqualified;
the latter being causes which, though not conclusively disqualifying, yet threw suspicion of
bias upon the juror.
Id. at 338, 13 S.E.2d 1016.
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in the words of our statute, the juror "is sensible of any bias or
prejudice.' 1
43
The grounds for disqualification for favor and the answer to the
question "Who questions?" (addressed later in this paper) constitute
the most rigorous tests of the net. The breadth of favor grounds
and the control of juror questioning determine whether the mesh of
the net is fine enough to catch subtle and deeply ingrained prejudice
and bias of every sort imaginable or whether the net is flawed by
large and quite serious holes.
I divide the discussion of challenges to the favor into two parts:
1) general rules concerning such challenges and 2) the most common
favor grounds found in the case law.
1. General Rules Governing Favor Challenges
The West Virginia Supreme Court has frequently articulated the
standard by which the merits of favor challenges are to be evaluated:
The true test as to whether a juror is qualified to sit on a panel is whether without
bias or prejudice he can render a verdict solely on the evidence under the instruc-
tions of the court.1"
In the event the prospective juror has preconceived notions about
the case, the test proceeds thusly:
In order that one who has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or
innocence of an accused may be accepted as a competent juror on such panel,
his mind must be in such condition to enable him to say on his voir dire, une-
quivocally and without hesitation, that such opinion will not affect his judgment
in arriving at a just verdict from the evidence alone submitted to the jury on the
trial of the case.'
4 5
143. Either party in any action or suit may, and the court shall on motion of such party,
examine on oath any person who is called as a juror therein, to know whether he is a qualified
juror, or is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or is sensible of any
bias or prejudice therein ....
W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12 (1966).
144. State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47, 49 (V. Va. 1987) (quoting State v. Harshbarger, 294 S.E.2d
254, 256 (W. Va. 1982)), and State v. Peacher, 280 S.E.2d 559, 569 fV. Va. 1981). See also State v.
Matney, 346 S.E.2d 818, 821 (W. Va. 1986) (quoting State v. Neider, 295 S.E.2d 902 (f. Va. 1982))
and State v. Deaner, 334 S.E.2d 627, 628 (W. Va. 1985) and cases collected there.
145. State v. Matney, 346 S.E.2d 818, 821-22 (XV. Va. 1986) (quoting State v. Johnson, 49 W.
Va. 684, 39 S.E.2d 665 (1901)).
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One of the purposes of voir dire, and of favor challenges in
particular, is to clear the way for the use of the parties' peremptory
challenges. 146 Accordingly, the West Virginia Supreme Court has re-
peatedly said that a party to a lawsuit is "entitled to a panel of...
jurors, each impartial and free from bias or prejudice, before being
required to exercise his rights as to peremptory challenges."'147
The pivotal role of the trial judge in dealing with favor challenges
also has been clearly set out by the Court:
So much depends upon the manner of the juror and his tone of voice and the
opportunity of the trial judge to see and know the juror that it is the settled
practice to not interfere with his findings, unless clearly against the evidence.1
48
This deference to the prudential judgments of the trial court is not
unlimited, however. When the examination of jurors on voir dire
reveals the possibility of prejudice or bias the court has the duty to
excuse the jurors or, at least, to question the prospective jurors or
to allow the attorneys to question them "to precisely determine
whether they entertain bias or prejudice for or against either party,
requiring their excuse."' 149
These general rules then are the parameters of the law governing
challenges to the favor in West Virginia.
2. Grounds for Favor Challenges
As the West Virginia Supreme Court has said, quoting Lord Coke,
"The causes of favor are infinite. '"150 Nonetheless, in an effort to
explain and give some shape to the West Virginia favor cases, I group
them here into categories that reflect those situations in which parties
and courts can most often expect to see favor challenges arise.
146. Discussed infra.
147. State v. Flint, 42 W. Va. 509, 514, 96 S.E.2d 677, 681 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 903
(1958).
148. Id.
149. State v. Deaner, 334 S.E.2d 627, 628 (W. Va. 1985) (citing numerous cases).
150. Thompson v. Douglass and Co., 35 W. Va. 337, 339, 13 S.E. 1015, 1016 (1891). "No
enumeration was ever attempted of what causes might be alleged as grounds of challenges to the favor.
It would be impossible to specify all that should be allowed in advance by a statute, for they depend
upon each particular case, and the circumstances and parties to it." Id.
[Vol. 91
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a. Bias or Prejudice Resulting from Relationship with a
Party, Attorney or Witness.'
51
i) Bias or Prejudice Resulting from Knowledge of the
Decedent in a Criminal Prosecution
The West Virginia Supreme Court has gone in opposite directions
in situations in which a prospective juror admitted knowledge of the
deceased victim in a criminal prosecution. In the first case, State v.
Flint,152 the juror, who had knowledge of the deceased and of how
the crime occurred, stated on voir dire that it would take much ev-
idence to erase his previous "impressions." The supreme court up-
held the trial court's refusal to excuse this juror apparently because
the juror later said that "he was not conscious of any bias or prej-
udice; that he could give the defendant and the State a fair and
impartial trial; that he had no opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the defendant; and that he could make his decisions as a juror
'entirely from the evidence.' "153
Twenty-nine years later, in State v. Matney,154 the court, in a per
curiam opinion, took the opposite tack. In Matney the prospective
juror said that he had been acquainted with the decedent and that
although he could render a fair verdict, "it would be hard."'' 5  Later,
the prospective juror, much like the prospective juror in Flint, was
heard to say that he could return a verdict solely on the law and
the evidence. The trial court then granted the State's challenge. The
supreme court upheld the dismissal of the juror, stating that in cases
where there is doubt as to whether the juror is impartial, "the doubt
must be resolved in favor of the juror's challenge.' 1 56 The Matney
court neither discussed nor cited Flint.
Thus, the law on knowledge of decedents is in conflict. The dif-
ference in treatment of the two jurors can only be explained by
151. Note that kinship relationships and attorney-client relationships are challenges for cause and
are treated above.
152. State v. Flint, 142 W. Va. 509, 96 S.E.2d 677 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 903 (1958).
153. Id. at 514, 96 S.E.2d at 681.
154. State v. Matney, 346 S.E.2d 818 (f. Va. 1986).
155. Id. at 821.
156. Id. at 822.
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hypothesizing that the Matney court believed the defendant there
received a fair trial and that the removal of the contested juror was
immaterial to the result. Undoubtedly, the treatment accorded the
contested juror in Flint is more reflective than Matney of how the
court treats many challenges to the favor. Generally, if the juror can
be led to say that he will be guided solely by the evidence and the
law, the trial court's refusal to allow a challenge to the favor will
not be ruled reversible error regardless of prior statements of the
juror that his opinion of the facts has been shaped by previous ex-
periences. 57
ii) Bias or Prejudice Resulting from Relationship With a
Party
Judging from the reports of trial court activity contained in the
appellate cases, West Virginia trial courts appear to excuse for favor
prospective jurors who are acquainted with parties somewhat more
often than not. This marginal predisposition to excuse jurors with
social relationships with parties reflects mainstream voir dire thinking
in the United States.158 Thus, the West Virginia cases in this area
deal not with the question of whether the trial courts erred for re-
fusing to excuse prospective jurors but whether it was error to excuse
them.159 In such cases, the court applies a harmless error rule and
uniformly finds that such excuses do not constitute reversible error
when the remaining panelists constituted an impartial jury.
In that minority of cases in which the trial court has refused to
excuse friends of a party, the trend appears to be toward overruling,
157. Before leaving this area, it should be noted that it is reversible error for the trial court to
refuse to allow questions as to whether the prospective jurors knew the decedent. State v. Peacher,
167 W. Va. 540, 554, 280 S.E.2d 559, 570 (1981).
158. See, e.g., W. JouANt, supra note 7, at 88-89:
Generally, all persons who could be suspected of bias because of their past or present business
or social relations with any of the parties should be excluded from the jury . . . . It stands
to reason that a prospective juror who is a close personal friend of one of the parties...
will have a hard time being completely fair and unprejudiced. It is very likely that, because
of that relationship, such juror will tend to favor the friend's cause or version.
Id.
159. See, e.g., Thompson v. Douglass, 35 W. Va. 337, 13 S.E. 1015 (1891), Ritz v. Kingdon,
139 W. Va. 189, 79 S.E.2d 123 (1953), overruled in part, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955), and
State v. Curtin, 332 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1985).
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rather than sustaining, the trial court's refusal to excuse. This trend
is illustrated in a recent case, West Virginia Department of Highways
v. Fisher,160 in which the supreme court reversed the trial court for
refusing to remove jurors who knew a party. This approach, too,
is consistent with the national trend to remove acquaintances of par-
ties from the panel of prospective jurors.
161
iii) Bias or Prejudice Resulting from Relationships with
Witnesses
a) Consanguineal Relationships
When the court is faced with determining whether a consangui-
neal juror-witness relationship creates bias or prejudice in the pro-
spective juror, it first takes a discriminating look at the nature of
the relationship to determine whether the challenge should be treated
as one for cause or for favor.
The leading case in this area is also the one in which the juror-
witness relationship was the most pronounced. State v. Kilpatrick62
was a prosecution of an individual accused of making abusive tel-
ephone calls. The prosecution, which intended to call a telephone
company employee as a key witness, apparently remained silent when
the witness's father was impaneled as a juror. When the juror vol-
unteered, after being sworn, that he was the father of the prosecution
witness, the defendant moved the trial court to remove him. The
trial court refused, and the supreme court reversed this refusal as
an abuse of discretion.
In the course of reaching this result, the court distinguished be-
tween prosecution witnesses and other witnesses. The court indicated
that prospective jurors who have consanguineal relationships with
prosecution witnesses ought to be promptly removed on the basis of
160. W. Va. Dept. of Highways v. Fisher, 289 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1982).
161. The Flint trial court's decision to refuse to exclude a juror who knew the defendant (adverted
to above) was affirmed, State v. Flint, 42 W. Va. 509, 96 S.E.2d 677 (1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
903 (1958), placing Flint in the minority.
162. State v. Kilpatrick, 158 W. Va. 289, 210 S.E.2d 480 (1974).
1989]
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cause, 163 whereas prospective jurors who have blood relationships with
non-prosecution witnesses must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis
to determine whether prejudice or the suspicion of prejudice exists. 164
A rule governing consanguineal juror-witness relationships in civil
cases has not been announced by the court. 165
b) Non-consanguineal Relationships
When the West Virginia Supreme Court confronts a non-con-
sanguineal juror-witness relationship in a civil case, it appears that
it treats the challenge as one for favor, requiring the trial court to
evaluate the prospective juror for actual bias or prejudice.166 In crim-
inal cases, however, one who has a non-consanguineal relationship
with a law enforcement official testifying in the case apparently is
challengeable for cause. 167
163. "The law is settled that, if a juror is within a prohibited degree of relationship to a pros-
ecuting witness, he should be excluded on motion of the adverse party." Id. at 293, 210 S.E.2d at
482.
164. "In judging possible prejudice on the part of a juror related to the witness other than the
prosecuting witness, each case must be decided on its own facts." Id. at 295, 210 S.E.2d at 484.
In Kilpatrick, the court found that allowing the witness's father to remain as a juror created at
least the suspicion of prejudice and was therefore an abuse of discretion.
The Kilpatrick approach is still good law. In State v. Wade, 327 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1985), the
court was faced with the question of whether the trial court's refusal to excuse two prospective jurors
who knew witnesses other than prosecuting witnesses was reversible error. The court performed a factual
analysis befitting a favor challenge and concluded that because the trial court's examination of the
jurors showed no bias or prejudice, the court did not abuse its discretion in retaining the jurors. (The
court did opine, however, that removal of the jurors would have been "a more prudent course." Id.
at 148.)
For cases from other jurisdictions, see Annotation, Social or Business Relationship Between Pro-
posed Juror and Non-Party Witness as Affecting Former's Qualifications as Juror, 11 A.L.R.3d 859
(1967).
165. Given the court's unequivocal rejection of jurors related to prosecuting witnesses, one would
think that the court, in regard to leading civil witnesses, would hesitate before embracing the general
rule which "appears to be . . . that an individual will not be disqualified from serving as a juror
simply because he is related, either by affinity or consanguinity, to a witness in a civil action." An-
notation, Juror's Relationship to Witness, in a Civil Case, as Ground of Disqualification or For Reversal
or New Trial, 85 A.L.R.2d 851 (1962).
166. This approach was implicit in the court's decision in Fisher, 289 S.E.2d 213, 220, cert. denied,
459 U.S. 944 (1982). In Fisher a number of jurors knew the plaintiff's witnesses. The court found
that the failure of the trial court to dismiss these (and other jurors) for favoring the plaintiff was
reversible error.
In State v. Collins, 329 S.E.2d 839, 846 (W. Va. 1984), the court hints that it will take a similar
approach in criminal cases when the relationship is to a witness other than a law enforcement official.
167. See text accompanying notes 114-141 and cf. State v. Crouch, 358 S.E.2d 782, 784-85 (W.
Va. 1987).
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b. Specific Political and Social Biases or Prejudices
Because "opinions with respect to the subject matter of particular
litigation may be held with such conviction as to prejudice one's
ability to render a verdict solely on the evidence under the instruc-
tions of the court,"' 6 the West Virginia Supreme Court has taken
pains to carefully scrutinize verdicts rendered by panels which the
trial courts have allowed to include persons who may have harbored
special biases or prejudices with particular impact on the case at
hand. Thus, the court has reversed criminal convictions in cases in-
volving juror opinions about welfare, t69 drug use,170 psychiatrists,
171
the insanity defense, 7 2 the presumption of innocence, 73  and racial
equality. 174
168. State v. Deaner, 334 S.E.2d 627, 628 (W. Va. 1985).
169. Id. at 627.
170. State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1983). But see State v. Harshbarger, 294 S.E.2d
254, 255-57 (V. Va. 1982) (court held that it was not reversible error for the trial court to inquire
about the attitudes of the prospective jurors regarding the legalization of marijuana in a prosecution
for the delivery of marijuana).
171. State v. Sanders, 242 S.E.2d 554 (V. Va. 1978), overruled, 168 W. Va. 211, 283 S.E.2d
914 (1981). See infra, note 173, for the question about psychiatrists that the trial court refused to ask.
In State v. Guthrie, 315 S.E.2d 397 (V. Va. 1984), the court said this about its decision in Sanders:
"[I]f a defendant requests, a court should have jurors questioned about their prejudices or biases against
persons suspected of having mental diseases or defects, and against psychiatrists or psychologists." Id.
at 404.
172. Sanders, 161 W. Va. 399, 242 S.E.2d 554. In Sanders, a murder prosecution in which the
defendant claimed insanity, the court held it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse to ask
these two voir dire questions:
Are there any members of the jury who have a bias or prejudice against psychiatrists, that
is doctors who study mental disease and disorders, to such an extent that you could not
fairly consider their testimony and opinions and give them like weight with other evidence
and testimony in the case?
Are there any persons on the jury who have a bias or prejudice either for or against persons
suspected of having a mental illness or defect such that they would not be able to fairly sit
as a juror in a case wherein the defendant was suspected of having such mental disease or
defect?
Id. at 404 n.4, 242 S.E.2d at 557 n.4. A less enlightened view is represented by State v. Harrison,
36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982, 984 (1892).
173. State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241, 128 S.E. 373 (1925).
174. State v. Dean, 130 W. Va. 257, 58 S.E.2d 860 (1950). Dean illustrates what the evidentiary
procedure permitted by W. Va. Code § 56-6-12 (1966) for proving the bias or prejudice of a juror
would look like, although in Dean the testimony appears to have been taken after the verdict in the
context of a new trial motion rather than prior to swearing of the jury in aid of voir dire.) See also
West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Tenpin Lounge, 158 W. Va. 349, 211 S.E.2d 349 (1975)
(court held that the trial court's refusal to allow the Commission to question jurors after the verdict
in an effort to prove they had lied on voir dire concerning their membership in segregated voluntary
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c. Bias or Prejudice Stemming from a Previously-Formed
Opinion 175
Our trial system depends upon the jury for its success. The char-
acter, intelligence, and life experiences of the jurors contribute heav-
ily to the quality of justice juries are capable of rendering. It is no
coincidence, therefore, that we require of jurors certain minimal at-
tributes-literacy, physical and mental ability, and majority age
t176
to promote proper decision-making. At the same time, our system
also depends upon formal rules of evidence to maintain the strict
control over information jurors receive that the system believes is
necessary for fair results. 177
These two goals collide when the prospective juror has educated
him or herself about the case prior to trial by obtaining information
about the case, by reflecting on the wisdom of the laws involved,
or by reflecting on relevant policy issues. The collision takes place
because obtaining knowledge and reflecting on issues almost inevi-
tably lead to the formation of an opinion about the proper result
organizations was error).
Tenpin also held that mere membership in such an organization is not a ground on which a
prospective juror can be dismissed for cause. Tenpin, 158 W. Va. at 356, 211 S.E.2d at 353.
The court's views on the racial attitudes of jurors has at times been less than progressive. One
of the most shameful opinions issued by the court in this area (second only, perhaps to State v. Strauder,
11 W. Va. 745 (1877), rev'd sub nom., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), in which the
court upheld the exclusion of blacks from jury duty, (see DiSalvo, supra note 9, at 228) is State v.
Lohm, 97 W. Va. 652, 125 S.E. 758 (1924), overruled, State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208 (NV. Va. 1986).
Lohm was accused of rape. The local Ku Klux Klan, in what was apparently a very emotionally-charged
atmosphere, acted as an investigator for the prosecution, rounding up evidence to be used. Moreover,
the Klan ran several sensational news stories about the case in its propaganda sheet. Despite all this
and despite the Klan's well-known prejudices, the trial court refused to exclude two self-confessed Klan
members from the jury. The Supreme Court of Appeals refused to reverse on this basis and then added
insult to injury when it went out of its way to strongly imply that the Klan was no different than any
other "class of good citizens." Lohm at 657, 125 S.E. at 760.
The court, just a little over two years later, thought a little differently of the issue saying that
in the future "it would be well . . . for jurors belonging to the Klan to be excused." State v. Siers,
103 W. Va. 30, 33, 136 S.E. 503, 504 (1927).
But shortly after Siers, the court replicated the approach it took in Lohm in State v. McMillion,
104 W. Va. 1, 138 S.E. 732 (1927).
175. Because the scope of this article is restricted to voir dire, this section does not treat the
question of prejudice and bias created by trial publicity.
176. W. VA. CODE § 52-1-8(b) (1988).
177. For a description of the purposes of the rules of evidence, see F. CEcitaEY, HANDBOOK ON
EVIDENCE FOR WEST VnmonA LAwYERs 4 (2d ed. 1986).
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in a case. The danger, of course, is that the juror's mind will not
operate solely on the basis of the information provided to the juror
in the confines of the courtroom.
This conflict between intelligent reflection on the world about
oneself and the open-mindedness required for fairness was squarely
faced by the West Virginia Supreme Court more than a hundred
years ago in State v. Schnelle.18 The court spoke then of the juror
with a prior opinion in these terms:
Why should he be excluded from the jury? Merely because from what he had
heard about the case [and] from what he had read he had formed and expressed
an opinion of the guilt or innocence of the accused? Such a rule would put a
discount on intelligence and a premium on ignorance. The human mind is so
constituted, that when it receives information on any subject, it will at once form
a hypothetical opinion upon such information.
79
The court then took this view of the ideal juror:
The well balanced mind will not be prejudiced by such an opinion, if afterwards
the information on which it was based is found to be incorrect or only partially
correct. The mind that can thus discriminate and not suffer itself to be prejudiced
by impressions formed on partial knowledge of the facts is the kind of mind that
ought to be possessed by every juror who tries an issue where the life or liberty
of a citizen is involved."'0
The court then prescribed the test which trial courts should em-
ploy when faced with a juror possessing an opinion gained from
previously acquired knowledge:
The prisoner has no right to object to any juror, who, although he has formed
and expressed an opinion as to his guilt or innocence, yet can truthfully say that
his mind is free from prejudice, and that the opinion previously formed will not
influence him in his verdict; but unless the proposed juror understands his own
mind on the question, and can promptly say, that it is at that time free from
prejudice, and that his mind is entirely free to pass upon the guilt or innocence
of the accused upon the evidence submitted to him as such juror, he is not a
competent juror and should be ordered to stand aside. 8'
The wisdom of the Schnelle court has withstood the test of time.
Over the past century and more, the West Virginia Supreme Court
178. State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767 (1884).
179. Id. at 780-81.
180. Id. at 781. The court is, of course, also interested in the fairness of civil juries. See, e.g.,
Malone v. Monongahela Valley Traction Co., 105 W. Va. 60, 141 S.E. 440 (1928).
181. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. at 782.
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has used the Schnelle opinion as the basis for its evolving test for
discriminating between knowledgeable jurors who should and should
not serve.
182
The test, as it has evolved to the present, consists of three steps 83:
(1) Does the juror have prior information of any sort about the facts of the case
or issues involved in the case?'1'
(2) If so, has that information led the juror to form an opinion about the merits
of the case?1 5
(3) Whether or not the juror believes he or she has formed an opinion, can the
juror
(a) unequivocally and without hesitation say that
(b) he or she can set aside any opinion he or she might have and
(c) reach a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the courtroom?'8 6
Clearly, a court will not disqualify a juror simply because the
juror has read about the case or obtained information in other ways. 187
Similarly, it is not enough to disqualify a juror on the sole ground
182. See State v. Gargiliana, 138 W. Va. 376, 76 S.E.2d 265 (1953); State v. Richards, 101 W.
Va. 136, 132 S.E. 375 (1926); State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241, 128 S.E. 373 (1925); State v. Toney,
98 W. Va. 236, 127 S.E. 35 (1925); State v. Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684, 39 S.E. 665 (1901); State v.
Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892); State v. Baker, 33 W. Va. 319, 10 S.E. 639 (1889).
183. As the court indicates in State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 837 n.7, 286 S.E.2d 234, 239 n.7,
this test is predicated on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.
794, 799-800 (1975). Murphy relies on another important United State Supreme Court case in the pre-
trial publicity area, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961). For commentary on Dowd, see W.
JosRw, supra note 7, at 74-76.
184. Common sources include newspaper, television, and radio reports, conversations with persons
involved, and conversations with persons having knowledge. See generally W. JoPDMwi, supra note 7,
at 73-74.
185. This is an objective, not a subjective, test. It is not necessary that the juror acknowledge
that he or she has actually formed an opinion. It is up to the trial court to decide whether an opinion
has been formed. "The significant aspect of the voir dire dialogue . . . is not the juror's uncertainty
as to whether he has formed an opinion . . . ." State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 837-38, 286 S.E.2d
234, 240 (1981). The judgment of the juror on this question, while "entitled to some consideration,
[is not to] be taken as conclusive." State v. Williams, 160 W. Va. 19, 26, 230 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1976).
See also State v. Pendry, 159 W. Va. 738, 747, 227 S.E.2d 210, 217 (1976) ("The existence of bias
or prejudice or other lack of qualification is addressed in the first instance to the trial court."), overruled
in part on other grounds, 161 W. Va. 168, 241 S.E.2d 914 (1978).
186. State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 837, 286 S.E.2d 234, 240 (1981). Some of the older cases
indicate that to support disqualification, the juror's opinion must be deliberate and decided. See, e.g.,
State v. Toney, 127 S.E. 35, 37 (1925). This gauge seems to have been discarded in favor of the strict
"hesitation and equivocation" test of Beck and other modem cases.
187. The court has made it clear on more than one occasion that simply "[h]aving some knowledge
of the case does not automatically disqualify a juror." See State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 835, 286
S.E.2d 234, 238 (1981); State v. Neider, 295 S.E.2d 902, 909 (w. Va. 1982).
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that the juror does, in fact, have a bias or prejudice without also
showing that the bias or prejudice will interfere with the juror's good
judgment.188 However, once it is determined that the juror has, at
the least, been exposed to prior extra-courtroom information, then
the trial court is required to determine by thorough individual ques-
tioning whether an opinion has been formed and, if so, to what
extent that opinion would affect the juror's judgment in the case. 189
(When the jury has been exposed to prejudicial information in the
courtroom, not only is individual questioning necessary, but it also
must be conducted in camera.19°) Should the questioning reveal that
this bias or prejudice will interfere with the jurors's good judgment,
then the juror is disqualified.
The key part of the test is the joint notion of promptness and
clarity. Can the juror say without qualification and without pausing
that he or she can put aside previously formed opinions and make
a decision on the evidence alone? Our supreme court's decisions have
been fairly uniform in enforcing this standard over a long period of
time. 19' Thus, the court has deemed jurors disqualified who "sup-
posed" they could be fair, 192 who "couldn't say" whether an opinion
based on newspaper accounts could be set aside, 93 who required
188. State v. Guthrie, 315 S.E.2d 397, 404-05 (W. Va. 1984).
189. State v. Neider, 295 S.E.2d 902, 908-09 (W. Va. 1982). See also State v. Williams, 160 W.
Va. 19, 24, 230 S.E.2d 742, 746 (1976). State v. Guthrie, supra note 188, illustrates the court's rejection
of a juror challenge in the light of incomplete questioning.
190. State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47, 51 (W. Va. 1987).
191. "Fairly" rather than consistently uniform because the court has occasionally allowed a verdict
to stand even when some hesitation and equivocation occurred in the juror's responses on voir dire.
For example, in State v. Beck, 167 W. Va. 830, 286 S.E.2d 234 (1981), when a juror was asked whether
she had formed an opinion about the defendant's guilt or innocence, she said "yes and no." Id. at
838, 286 S.E.2d at 240. About this response the court was correct to point out that hesitation concerning
whether one had formed an opinion is not dispositive of the prejudice question. The juror was also
asked, however, whether she could render a true verdict based on the evidence, to which she responded,
"outside of how I feel I guess not." Id. at 838, 286 S.E.2d at 240. There is little equivocation here:
the juror is saying that she cannot render a verdict on the evidence. But the court excuses this frank
admission because she was later asked the same question, to which she effectively answered this time
"yes." What could be more equivocal than two opposite answers to the same question? Yet the court
refused to find her disqualified. Perhaps without saying so, the court has resurrected the long-neglected
Watkins harmless error rule. Watkins v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 130 W. Va. 268, 43 S.E.2d 219 (1947).
See supra note 38.
192. State v. Schnelle, 24 W. Va. 767, 781 (1884).
193. State v. Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684, 691, 39 S.E. 665, 668 (1901). Johnson held that it was
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evidence to set aside a judgment that the defendant was guilty, 94
who expressed doubt about being influenced by comments heard prior
to trial, 195 and who "thought" they could set aside previous opinion
and rule solely on the evidence.
96
In this setting, as in other favor contexts, there is a clear danger
that our system will permit prejudiced and biased persons to sit on
juries. The danger arises here, as it does elsewhere, from two sources.
The first source consists of the proclivity toward the use of leading
questions which those judges and lawyers wishing to retain jurors
on the panel have. These persons employ leading questions to induce
the hesitant juror to say that he or she could render a verdict solely
on the evidence. The principal characteristic of the leading question,
of course, is that it gives the cross-examiner, not the witness, an
opportunity to make statements. For this reason, some lawyers and
judges employ leading questions on voir dire. Furthermore, they are
unencumbered by the inconvenience of leading-question objections,
which are not recognized on voir dire. This misuse of the leading
question can distort the process of gathering accurate and reliable
information on voir dire. The second source of the danger stems
from the need each juror has to maintain an image of himself or
herself as an upright and fair-minded citizen. After a juror has hon-
estly admitted a preconceived opinion, the leading question tells the
typical juror that something is amiss and that the juror has answered
in an inappropriate manner. Because the juror wants to please the
judge as authority figure and his or her colleagues on the panel and
wants to conform to socially acceptable conduct, the juror too often
will allow himself or herself to be led. 97
194. State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241, 244, 128 S.E. 373, 374 (1925) (Messer states that when the
juror's opinion is "decided" the juror is to be disqualified. Id. at 241, 128 S.E. at 373); State v.
Johnson, 49 W. Va. 684, 696, 39 S.E. 665, 667 (1901). See also State v. Hatfield, 48 W. Va. 561,
37 S.E. 626 (1900) (not error to exclude juror who required evidence to move him from his pre-conceived
opinion).
195. State v. Gargiliana, 138 W. Va. 376, 380, 76 S.E.2d 265, 267-68 (1953).
196. State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 35, 37-38 (W. Va. 1983).
197. The United States Supreme Court said this in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961),
about the reliability of such answers: "No doubt each juror was sincere when he said that he would
be fair and impartial to petitioner, but the psychological impact requiring such a declaration before
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The danger is exacerbated in civil cases. Since 1985, the Legis-
lature has allowed juries to consist of only six persons.1 98 Previously,
the damage a prejudiced or biased person could do was limited by
virtue of that person being but one juror of twelve. Now, however,
that juror plays a more prominent role in the jury's decision because
of the jury's diminished size. The risk of unjust verdicts is enhanced.
To decrease the likelihood that persons who are truly prejudiced
and biased will be empanelled as jurors, lawyers and judges ought
to avoid the inappropriate use of the leading question. This is es-
pecially important for judges, for it is to their exercise of discretion
that the supreme court often defers. 99 Even more important, the
court should strictly enforce its rule that requires the prompt dis-
missal of any juror who hesitates and equivocates on the question
of his or her ability to render a verdict solely on the evidence.
D. Peremptory Challenges
Arbitrariness and capriciousness are not welcome in the law. Yet,
in the area of peremptory challenges, the exception is the rule.20 In
both civil and criminal jury trials, the litigants possess the right to
remove limited numbers of jurors from the qualified panel for vir-
tually any reason or no reason whatsoever. 201
The purpose of allowing peremptory challenges, however, is not
to encourage irrationality but to advance the goal of an impartial
198. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-11 (Supp. 1988).
199. The determination of the qualification of a juror is a problem often difficult to solve.
The fact sought to be established, whether the juror may be biased or prejudiced, rests alone
with the proposed juror, and often he may be unable to honestly determine whether he would
be unduly influenced by certain facts or situations in consideration of the evidence to be
offered. Usually the answer is left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Beacraft,
126 W. Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541 [(1944), overruled, State v. Dolin, 347 S.E.2d 208 (%V. Va.
1986)]; State v. Camp, 110 W. Va. 444, 158 S.E. 664 [1931]. His experience in such matters,
often aided by some knowledge of the character, abilities and habits of the particular juror,
coupled with the fact that he observes the demeanor and expression of the juror on voir
dire examination, are justifiable reasons for vesting wide discretion in him.
State v. Gargiliana, 138 W. Va. 376, 379-80, 76 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1953).
200. "For [the peremptory challenge] is, as Blackstone says, an arbitrary and capricious right ... "
Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 378 (1882).
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trial by permitting each side to remove jurors whom it believes, for
whatever reason, are hostile to its cause or friendly to its opponent's
cause. 2 2 To fulfill this purpose, the law of voir dire does not require
a litigant to account to the court for his or her motives in removing
a juror peremptorily. 23 An objection to a peremptory strike will sim-
ply not be heard.2°4
One important exception to the exception does exist, however.
In Batson v. Kentucky,2 5 the United States Supreme Court held that
the equal protection clause forbids a criminal prosecutor from per-
emptorily removing jurors "solely on account of their race or on
the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially
to consider the State's case against a black defendant.' '206 At the
same time, the Supreme Court relieved the defendant of the burden
imposed by Swain v. Alabamaw to prove discrimination by showing
a pattern of racial discrimination by the prosecution in a number of
cases over time. Instead, once the defendant shows that he or she
is a member of a cognizable group, 2°8 that the prosecutor has used
the peremptory challenge to remove jurors who are group members
in the defendant's case, and that the facts infer a racial motivation,
then the prosecutor must justify his or her action by demonstrating
a neutral reason for the exclusion of the jurors in question.
Batson leaves in its wake a number of new questions: Will de-
fendants of one cognizable group eventually be permitted to challenge
202. "[A] party . . . has a right to an impartial and unbiased jury; and, in order to insure that
right, the party is entitled . . to meaningful voir dire examination and peremptory challenges of the
prospective jurors." Barker v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 148, 152 (W. Va. 1984). The
United States Supreme Court has said the purpose of peremptory strikes is to "eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides" and "to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 219 (1965), overruled, Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
203. STARR & McCoRMIcK, JuRY SELECboN 315 (1985).
204. 47 AM. JuR. 2D Juries § 235 (1969).
205. Batson, 476 U.S. at 79.
206. Id. at 89.
207. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
208. It is widely recognized in the field of jury composition law that groups characterized by
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the exclusion of jurors belonging to another cognizable group?2°9 Will
a defendant who belongs to no cognizable group be able to challenge
the exclusion of those who do? 210 Does Batson apply to criminal
defendants?21' Could it be made to apply to parties to civil actions
as well? 212 Does Batson signal the oncoming demise of the peremptory
challenge generally?2 3 We await the United States Supreme Court's
resolution of these questions. In the meantime, it is clear that state
court decisions refusing to find reversible error in race-based per-
emptory challenges in single cases by criminal prosecutors, such as
West Virginia's State v. Clements, 2 4 no longer obtain.
However, for the foreseeable future, setting group-based chal-
lenges aside, the peremptory challenge is alive and well in West Vir-
ginia. In fact, the very institution of voir dire is often explained in
many of our cases as the predicate for the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 21 5 While the peremptory challenge is neither a state nor
209. Batson would seem to require same-class membership. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95. In Fields
v. People, 732 P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987), the Colorado Supreme Court used an equal protection analysis
to conclude that a black defendant may challenge the exclusion of Hispanics.
210. Peters v. Kifl, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), in which the Supreme Court allowed a white defendant
to employ the wrongful exclusion of blacks from jury lists as a basis for relief in a federal habeas
corpus action, suggests an affirmative answer. Since Batson some state courts have held that white
defendants cannot use Batson to challenge the exclusion of blacks, State v. Christenson, 720 S.W.2d
738 (Mo. App. 1986). and that whites have no state constitutional right to challenge the exclusion of
blacks, Kibler v. State, 501 So. 2d 76 (Fla. App. 1987), while others have employed their state con-
stitutions' fair trial provisions to allow non-group members to challenge the exclusion of jurors be-
longing to cognizable groups. See State v. Gilmore, 199 N.J. Super. 389, 489 A.2d 1175 (1985), cert.
granted, 101 N.J. 285, 501 A.2d 948, aff'd, 103 N.J. 508, 511 A.2d 1150 (1986); Riley v. State, 496
A.2d 997 (Del. Super. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass.
461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,
148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978).
211. See Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky,
88 CoLum. L. REv. 355 (1988) (arguing that equal protection requires extension of the rule).
212. See Esposito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that Batson applies
only to criminal cases) and Clark v. Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890 (D. Conn. 1986) (holding that Batson
applies to civil actions when there is state action).
213. There is no constitutional right to peremptory challenges that would bar their abolition. See
Stilson v United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919). In his concurrence, Mr. Justice Marshall proposes
that peremptory challenges in criminal cases be banned altogether. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 102 (Marshall,
J., concurring). For a review of the virtues of peremptory challenges, see Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving
"Its Wonderful Power", 27 STANsoan L. Rv. 545 (1975).
214. State v. Clements, 334 S.E.2d 600, 609 (W. Va. 1985).
215. It is important for courts and litigants to recognize that the voir dire examination, if
it is to serve its proper function, must of necessity be directed not only to establishing a
19891
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federal constitutional right, its exercise is assured by statute in civil
cases (W. Va. Code § 56-6-12), by statute in felony cases (W. Va.
Code § 62-3-3), and by rule in misdemeanor and felony cases (West
Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure § 24(b)).
Each civil litigant is entitled to four peremptory strikes.2 6 In fel-
ony trials the defense is entitled to six strikes, while the prosecution
is entitled to two. 217 In misdemeanor trials each side receives four
peremptory strikes. 2 8 Certain circumstances may lead to an expan-
sion by the court of the number of peremptory strikes allowed. For
example, if a criminal defendant can demonstrate good cause for
expansion, such as prejudicial pre-trial publicity, the court can ex-
ercise its discretion under § 24(b) to grant additional peremptory
strikes.219 A second situation calling for the expansion of the number
of peremptory strikes permitted in civil or criminal cases occurs when
there are multiple parties with conflicting interests on the same side
of the case. The West Virginia Supreme Court has indicated that it
is clear error to deny multiple civil parties on the same side with
demonstrably hostile interests the full number of strikes each. 0 There
is no reason to believe the court would treat multiple criminal de-
fendants, for whom there are all-important liberty interests at stake,
any differently. 22'
Although the scope of voir dire is "left largely to the discretion
of the trial court,"2 denial of the right to exercise peremptory chal-
basis of a challenge for cause, but also to enable a litigant and his counsel to exercise
reasonable judgment in utilizing peremptory challenges.
State v. Pendry, 159 W. Va. 738, 746, 227 S.E.2d 210, 217 (1976) overruled in part on other grounds
by Jones v. Warden, West Virginia Penitentiary, 161 W. Va. 168, 241 S.E.2d 914 (1978). See also
Barker v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1984); State v. Ashcraft, 309 S.E.2d
600 (W. Va. 1983); W. Va. Human Rights Commission v. Tenpin Lounge, 158 W. Va. 349, 211 S.E.2d
349 (1975). As for the scope of voir dire in aid of peremptory challenges, see Part Two of this article.
216. W. VA. CODE § 56-6-12a (1966 & Supp. 1988). If alternates are employed, the number of
peremptory strikes available to a civil litigant rises in proportion to the number of alternates. See W.
VA. R. Crv. P. 47(b).
217. W. VA. CODE § 62-3-3 (Repl. Vol. 1984); W. VA. R. CRtms. P. 24(b).
218. W. VA. R. Cane. P. 24(b).
219. See W. VA. R. Cpn. P. 24(b); State v. Clements, 334 S.E.2d 600, 609 (W. Va. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 857 (1985).
220. Tawney v. Kirkhart, 130 W. Va. 550, 563, 44 S.E.2d 634, 641 (1947).
221. W. VA. R. Cium. P. 24(b)(1)(B) (court authorized to grant additional peremptory strikes to
multiple criminal defendants).
222. State v. Stonestreet, 112 W. Va. 668, 669, 166 S.E. 378, 379 (1932). See also, Henthorn v.
Long, 146 W. Va. 636, 653, 122 S.E.2d 186, 196 (1961).
[Vol. 91
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lenges altogether is clearly reversible error.2 3 Moreover, our cases
have made it clear that a litigant is entitled to exercise the right of
peremptory challenges against a panel of prospective jurors who are
wholly free from disqualifying characteristics, 224 saying in particular
that the exercise of a peremptory challenge against a juror who should
have been previously excused by the trial court for cause or favor
does not cure the error. 225
III. CONCLUSION
We have reviewed and analyzed the four types of challenges-
challenges to the array, challenges for cause, challenges to the favor,
and peremptory challenges. In part two of this Article, which the
reader will find in a future issue of the West Virginia Law Review,
I will review and analyze voir dire procedure, examine the biases and
prejudices left untouched by current voir dire law, and propose meth-
ods for using voir dire for its true purpose of securing fair juries
and fair trials.
223. Barker v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 324 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1984); Tawney v. Kirkhart,
130 W. Va. 550, 44 S.E.2d 634 (1947); State v. Pearis, 35 W. Va. 320, 13 S.E 1006 (1891).
224. State v. Bennett, 304 S.E.2d 35, 37 (XV. Va. 1983); State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241, 245-
56, 128 S.E. 373, 374 (1925); State v. Davis, 91 W. Va. 241, 112 S.E. 414 (1922).
225. State v. Messer, 99 W. Va. 241, 246, 128 S.E. 373, 374 (1925).
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